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ATTRIBUTING ACTS OF OMISSION
TO THE STATE*
Gordon A. Christenson**
He governs with a loose rein, that he may govern at all; and the whole of
the force and vigour of his authority in his centre is derived from a prudent
relaxation in all his borders.
Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies,
Mar. 22, 17751
I. INTRODUCTION: FAILURE OF DUTY AS STATE CONDUCT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In determining what conduct is attributable to the State under the
international law of State responsibility, we normally work from spe-
cific behavior of particular government officials acting alone or in con-
cert.2 Because the abstract "State" acts only through "agents" in
control of the State or some part of its apparatus, any such acts of
those individuals are attributed to the State if done under actual or
apparent authority of the State.3 Responsibility of the State engages
when such conduct causes harm in breach of international obligation.4
Beyond these common understandings, however confused they
may have become with analogies from private law,' suppose the ques-
* Comprehensively expanded and revised from a paper presented before the American
Society of International Law at its annual meeting in Washington, D. C., on March 29, 1990.
** University Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Cincinnati. I would like to
express thanks to my research assistants, Ruel Ash, David Clodfelter and Karina Gonzalez, for
their valuable assistance.
I. I WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 464-71, reprinted in I THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 3, 5 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
2. Brierly explains: "[States] have no wills except the wills of the individual human beings
who direct their affairs; and they exist not in a political vacuum but in continuous political
relations with one another." J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 55 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963).
3. Christenson, The Doctrine of Attribution in State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 321 (R. Lillich ed. 1983).
4. I. BROWNLIE, I SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 132-50
(1983).
5. Analogies to agency or vicarious liability in municipal law help explain why a "superior"
may be responsible for acts of the agent or subordinate. If pushed too far these private law
analogies confuse political power with other policy functions such as allocating risk of economic
loss. Likewise, sovereign immunity is used sometimes to determine when conduct is attributed to
the corporate legal personality of.the State as sovereign and hence immune from municipal liabil-
ity. States acting in their sovereign capacities are legally responsible to other States only under
international law and not under domestic or municipal law of the other State. The conduct of
State-owned commercial enterprises is not usually shielded and, hence, not attributed to the State
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tion is whether a government acts by omission through its loose reins
or failure to control. The problem of an act of omission has a long
moral tradition.6 By analogy, highly problematic sources of analysis
from municipal law abound. 7 The tendency for those in power to
achieve their ends through private or non-State actors, thereby avoid-
ing attribution, engenders a wide range of conduct by inaction where
both deniability and non-attribution serve to enhance the power of
those in control of a State, if they in fact have control. A domestic
form of political corruption (use of public power for private ends) by
omission may occur legally, as in loosening the reins of regulatory con-
trols to reward political friends with opportunity to profit from specu-
lation (as in the Teapot Dome or savings and loan scandals in the
United States), in effect socializing any loss or transferring gain from
public funds. Domestic raids on public coffers for the private ends of
public officials often depend upon omissions or official inaction either
legitimized by law or reflected in discretionary enforcement. Rents of
office leading to transfers to private political supporters often depend
upon loose regulatory reins. Traditional moral philosophy places
moral responsibility for evil results upon those taking direct and inten-
tional actions. Actions having indirect evil results, as in corruption
following from a legislative "green light" or incidental killing of civil-
ians in bombing raids, often do not yield the same degree of culpabil-
under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Similarly, non-State or private conduct not
shielded is not attributed. These analogies and tests are not free from challenge, but they are
useful to see the main principle that a State ought to be responsible for the official actions of thoge
in control of a State. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALO-
GIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 134-43 (1927); see also H. LASKI, STUDIES IN LAW AND POLI-
TICS 268 (1932) (criticizing Hegel's view that international law is merely an external municipal
law).
6. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 19-29, 52-53 (1978) (introducing intentionality and
cause as better tests of right or wrong action than the distinclion between act and omission when
under duty; and distinguishing between individual choices and results in States-of-the-world).
7. In domestic criminal law, a person who by omission voluntarily brings about a result
defined as crime commits a wrongful act when under a common law or statutory duty to act.
Kadish, Act and Omission, Mens Rea, and Complicity. Approaches to Codification, I CRIMINAL
LAW FORUM 65, 70-71 (1989). Hughes; Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1960). In Eng-
lish law, see Ashworth, The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissiong, 105 L.Q. REV. 424 (1989).
For a comparison of French with English law, see Ashworth & Steiner, Criminal Omissions and
Public Duties: the French Experience, 10 LEGAL STUD. 153 (1990) (moral duty of assisting ema-
nates from social solidarity, but is difficult to prove). A reexamination of the public duties of a
citizen is urged in both civil and criminal omissions for revision of English law. Id. at 164. In
tort law, a duty may arise from a relationship or circumstance of control (such as duty to care for
a child in custody or a duty to provide health care service in a hospital or nursing home). The
failure of action when required by duty becomes wrongful action attributable to the person with
the duty. Often the question in private tort actions involves intent or negligence, namely some
form of fault. But see, I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 37-38, 40-47 (challenging the use of munic-
ipal law metaphors such as intention (dolus) or negligence (culpa) in international law of State
responsibility and maintaining an objective standard of failure of duty (an omission being then an
objective failure of duty to act)).
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ity. Theologians have been debating the relevance of the traditional
distinctions and await an expected Vatican statement.8 When does
this kind of failure of action or control amount to State conduct for
the purpose of determining the responsibility of the State under inter-
national law? 9
Pinning down these omissions as conduct of State would seem
hopelessly like clutching for air were it not for a surprising number of
recurring examples and experiences in State practice that insist on ex-
amination. A classic confusion often begins with the Trail Smelter
arbitration, cited for the proposition that under international law a
State is responsible for private activities originating within its territory
passing into the territory of another State and causing harm.t° Con-
sider, for example, emerging State practice about determining a gov-
ernment's responsibility when it fails to control vigilantes" t or private
death squads,' 2 fails to prevent massive pollution of the environ-
ment,' 3 fails to contain terrorist violence, 14 fails to protect against ter-
rorism or private violence or threats directed against aliens and their
property,' 5 fails to prevent a massacre of innocent civilians in occupied
territory, 16 fails to control its law enforcement officials when operating
8. See Steinfels, Theology Awaits the Vatican's Word on Evils Lesser and Greater, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1990, § 4, at 6, col. 1.
9. See Christenson, supra note 3, at 335-41. See also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 161-62,
165-66.
10. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938 (1941). See C.
EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1928) ("A State
owes at all times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by individuals from within
its jurisdiction."). While the Trail Smelter arbitration award held Canada "responsible in inter-
national law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter," a private smelting plant in Canada, whose
emissions caused injury to orchards in the'United States, the holding seems narrowly limited to
the context of the compromis. Properly analyzed, the attribution of conduct to Canada would
not be under some strict liability theory of respondeat superior for the private conduct of the Trail
Smelter but rather would be for the Canadian Government's own official failure to maintain a
regime of control in the face of the duty recognized in the compromis as grounded in interna-
tional law. Failure to establish and supervise a regime of control would thus constitute an act of
omission attributable to the State.
11. See J. MOORE, 6 DIG. OF INT'L L. 837-44 (1906) (lynching of Italians at New Orleans);
C. EAGLETON, supra note 10, at 131-34.
12. See Berman & Clark, infra note 150 and accompanying text.
13. Christenson, supra note 3, at 337. See Handl, Liability as an Obligation Established by a
Primary Rule of International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1985).
14. Condorelli, The Imputability to States of Acts of International Terrorism, 19 IsR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 233 (1990) ("horizontal effect" or "Drittwerkung" of human rights places a duty to
control and prevent terrorist activities under State's jurisdiction, the failure of which is attributa-
ble as State conduct). The difficulty of the burden of producing evidence showing the State had
the means to prevent terrorist activity and the rarity of cases of attributing such an omission
relates to presumptions about attribution, discussed infra note 154 and accompanying text.
15. Lillich & Paxman, infra note 150.
16. See discussion of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, infra notes 163-72 and accompanying
[Vol. 12:312
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with police in another country, 17 or fails to prevent massive abuse of
human rights in State territory.1 8 Loose reins or inadequate control
over private activities by States under mandatory obligations from
United Nations Security Council resolutions present even more dra-
matically the vital public order questions central to the problem of
attributing omissions as conduct of State. 19
As Professor Ian Brownlie explains, procedural questions giving
practical effect to expectations of the international community are
equally, if not more, important to international legitimacy and the rec-
ognition of arrangements of control within a State when a State has
exclusive control over internal events, information and communica-
tions.20 Where are claims of failures of duty made? Who decides the
validity of the claim and for what purpose? Is proof of "attribution"
of an omission to the State an element of claim? Are intentionality
and causation part of the elements of claim? What burdens of proof or
presumptions of evidence operate?2'
A. Asking the Right Questions
The initial question seems empirical. Have those in control of the
State objectively failed to take action required to meet an international
obligation?22 This question defining an omission of State has two for-
17. One example is the Mexican protest over the abduction of Dr. Alvarez Machain in Mex-
ico and his subsequent transfer to the United States for indictment in the torture and murder of
Enrique Camarena, an American agent in Mexico. The abduction may have involved "under the
table" deals and a denial that "agents" paid by the Drug Enforcement Agency in fact were
government officials when they forcibly captured Dr. Machain. See Lowenfeld, Kidnaping by
Government Order: A Follow-up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1990) (skepticism about assertions by
U.S. Government that abductions of persons ending up in U.S. custody were done by foreign
police and that foreign country consented or that U.S. agents did not participate in torture). U.S.
District Judge Edward Rafeedie ordered Dr. Alvarez extradited back to Mexico because the
abduction violated the Treaty of Extradition between the United States and Mexico. See US.
Appeals Order to Return Suspect to Mexico, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1990, § 1, at 9, col. 2 (U.S.
Department of Justice has appealed the order).
18. Shelton, infra note 21.
19. Enforcement actions are rare, but they impose the clearest of affirmative obligations upon
States to implement Security Council actions taken by controlling persons, events and things
under control of members of the United Nations. Two have called on nations to exercise control
to implement certain actions against aggressor nations, North Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990;
two have called for sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa. See H. STRACK, SANCTIONS:
THE CASE OF RHODESIA 244 (1978) (governments may be unable or unwilling to control trans-
national relations by non-governmental elites in order to carry out sanctions).
20. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 164-65.
21. Id. at 86-88. For an excellent review, including burdens of proof and presumptions in-
volving omissions, see Shelton, Judicial Review of State Action by International Courts, 12 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 361 (1989).
22. See Dupuy, The International Law of State Responsibility: Revolution or Evolution?, I 1
MICH. J. INT'L L. 105, 110 (1989) (following classical doctrine of objective international law
articulated by Anzilotti as a causal link imputing wrongful activities to State behavior, signifying
a break from the theory of culpa or fault from natural law).
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mal aspects as well as a third perspective which is more subjective and
psychological. 23 The first aspect formally addresses the sources of
substantive obligation requiring positive action in the particular situa-
tion, whether from the clearest Security Council directives, from less
clear treaty obligations, or from arguable duties under customary in-
ternational law. The second aspect frames decision through process,
using analysis of procedural matters to shape attribution questions.
Who decides whether to attribute an omission to a State? What party
has standing to claim an omission of State is wrongful? How is the
burden of persuasion allocated? What presumptions and inferences of
fact, burdens of proof and standards of evidence are used to show a
duty and a breach by omission and for what purposes? What meas-
ures, remedies or sanctions follow from an omission of State breaching
international obligation?
The inquiry scarcely scratches the surface with these two tradi-
tional and formal questions. More critically, do we want to know
about motives of individual officials, often hidden in expressions of na-
tional self-interest? Do we care, for example, what reasons and incen-
tives national officials have to undertake or to avoid undertaking an
affirmative international obligation? 24 How might they mask their
true motives by legalistic escape techniques? Before they are morally
culpable, must their intentions be shown to the same extent as Profes-
sor Fried thinks is required for omissions by individuals? 25 Against
powerful internal or domestic forces such as a fundamentalist religious
revolution, revolutionary or mob violence against outsiders, a declara-
tion of independence by a political subunit, or external aggression, ac-
tion to control aberrant behavior may not be prudent. Though
obligatory concerted action may be demanded by an international
norm or directive, benign neglect of State may serve many subjective
political purposes. Indeed, through loose reins government inaction
can function as easily as a conscious part of the prudent exercise of
power,26 as a function of corruption or impotence, to paraphrase FA-
23. In the objective theory, no reference is made to the psychological state of the actor or the
subjective motive, thus requiring rationalization through fictions. Id. For the view that omis-
sions of State require proof of a subjective state of mind approaching malice while overt actions
may rely upon the objective theory, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 42-43, 46-47 (criticizing
Strupp, Guggenheim and others for requiring fault in the case of wrongs of omission but not for
wrongs of commission, since failure of duty to act is wholly consistent with objective theory).
Professor Harris points out that "State practice on this theoretical question is, so far as it is
available, of little help." D. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 378,
384 (3d ed. 1983).
24. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 110-11.
25. C. FRIED, supra note 6.
26. See I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 5.
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mund Burke. Inaction also may reflect merely the realism of impo-
tence, a loss of any effective power to control, which if not attributed
to the State has consequences for those under the State's protection.
Considerable energy and political skill are needed to marshal re-
sources and organize the operations necessary to carry out some inter-
national duty to act. Unless survival or a vital interest is at stake, it is
often easier for decision-makers to stop some minor official outrage or
to ensure a process to compensate or pay compensation (often "ex gra-
tia" or without responsibility)27 for the harms emanating from those
with power, than it is to organize the apparatus of public and non-
State actors cooperatively to comply with international obligations re-
quiring action in the first place. 28 Self-interested private action might
be easier to motivate and sustain through pursuit of private profit or
personal power by conscious restraint or by a posturing policy of rhet-
oric without action. In appraising omissions of State, therefore, the
distinction between public (or official) and private (or non-State) con-
duct remains troublesome.
B. The Context of Attribution in State Responsibility
In the nation-State system, with obligations and rights running be-
tween sovereign States, the modern law of State responsibility has de-
veloped historically through what Professor R.B. Lillich calls twin
fictions. 29
These legal fictions are devices for attributing an injury to a claim-
ant State (or community of States) and a wrongful act to a respondent
State.30 They are useful fictions for erecting opaque barriers to protect
those in control of the affairs of a State. Harm to a State always bur-
dens particular individuals (officials, elites or private citizens) even if
expressed as harm to a national interest such as environment or secur-
ity. State conduct always involves human behavior and decisions,
even if cloaked in State or public interest (public choice theory seeks to
27. See Leich, Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a Humanitarian Basis, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 319 (1989); Maier, Ex Gratia Compensation Payments and the Iranian Airline Trag-
edy, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 325 (1989) (payments ex gratia withhold acquiescence and evidence
demonstrating a sense of legal obligation for emerging norm of customary international law).
28. See Lowenfeld, Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 336 (1989) (repa-
rations accepting responsibility, not ex gratia payments, should be made when objective State
responsibility is clear under treaty or customary international law, as in the Iranian airliner
incident).
29. R. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 11-14 (1984).
30. One of the best conceptual interpretations of inter-State relations accounting for the attri-
bution of harm (diplomatic protection) and attribution of wrongful conduct (international re-
sponsibility) is found in C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 236, 277-94 (P. Corbett trans. rev. ed. 1968).
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explain incentives for individual official choices in terms of personal
power or self-interestedness).3 Attributing harm or conduct to sover-
eignty personified is a convenient metaphor for concentrating and pro-
tecting internal power to integrate national interests by the controlling
elites.
The first legal fiction follows Vattelian State positivism, often used
in the 19th and early 20th Centuries, in recognizing that a State is
injured when its nationals or direct interests suffer international wrong
and that the State may seek satisfaction or reparation for that harm. 32
This kind of attribution of harm developed generally under the cate-
gory of diplomatic protection of nationals, a modern form of the pater-
nalistic organization of blood feud or kinship claims preliminary to
their being "bought off" or "composed," a primitive but effective form
of self-help remedy.33 German idealism also helped personify injury in
the corporate body of the State even while rejecting the natural rights
of free and equal States in pre-society propounded by Vattel. Hegel
criticized the European Enlightenment view that underpinned Vattel's
natural rights theory, that States independent and equal in nature
must consent to international law just as individuals in a state of na-
ture do in the social contract to form government. This critique led
Hegel to propound a different view of a State's identity, one that sees a
State as a Romantic "person" through a World Spirit in history. The
State's purpose, on that view, would define injury to this identity, and
reparations no doubt would serve to compose injury or wrong into the
State's ultimate purpose from within through a dialectic rectitude of
mediating and transcending Spirit embodying the State's will.34
31. See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE
(1979); R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
32. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at
6, 12 (Aug. 30). See E. DE VATrEL, 2 THE LAW OF NATIONS 136 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916):
Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect that citizen. The
sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to
give full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not obtain the chief end
of civil society, which is protection.
33. See A. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF
JUSTICE (1938).
34. See C. TAYLOR, HEGEL 542-44 (1975). Hegel's State, according to Taylor, now has
disintegrated by prizing "the individual more and more loose from any partial grouping." Id. at
543. For Hegel, the "modern mixture of private Romanticism and public utilitarianism is rather
civil society run wild, a society which has become a 'heap'." Id. at 542. Carty believes that the
remnant of this idealized and personified State creates opaqueness and an inability to penetrate
into inner power structures to relate them to an international moral order, hence decay. A.
CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 108-115 (1986); Carty, Changing Models of the
International System, in PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 22-23 (W.E. Butler ed.
1990) (outlining the further demise of liberalism in international law and the near impossibility of
using international legal discourse to restructure the international system).
[Vol. 12:312
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The second fiction, the other side of Vattel's coin symbolizing
States as individuals in nature, is the attribution to the State of the
wrongful acts or omissions by specificnatural persons. Here as well,
German idealism reinforced the transformation of the individual will
of officials into the purpose of the State and its personified will. Kant
differed from Hegel in allowing the possibility that a personification of
subjective State action could breach an objective obligation, subjective
moral duty being in conflict with the objective agreement of States.
Through objective law, States would compose or settle the conflict by
invoking legal principle and relying upon external judgment such as
arbitration. Hegel destroyed the idea of the social contract and natu-
ral rights as applied to States and merged the subjective will of the
State with its universal spirit, admitting no possibility of acting incon-
sistently with another normative system not its own. The constant
dialectic and synthesis may require war to resolve the contradiction.
He rejected the Kantian idea of an everlasting peace kept by a league
of nations settling disputes by invoking a highly contingent unanimity
resting upon consensus of particular independent wills. Hegel would
not overlook the failures of the internal organism of the State itself in
dwelling upon its extrinsic phases. 35 The affirmative spirit remains de-
spite defect in the organic State. The world court is World Spirit.
Under any of these theories, attribution of conduct became an indi-
visible part of the concept of international responsibility. This concep-
tual formulation has definite Kantian roots in the Enlightenment
notion of a State as subjective actor with responsibility attaching only
after an objective obligation is breached by the subjective act. 36
Thereby, in inter-State relations, both harm to nationals or national
interests and responsibility for wrongful conduct were reified in the
abstraction of the sovereign person of the "State. '37
35. See supra note 34. See also E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 263-76 (1946).
HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 247, 338-39 (S. Dyde trans. 1896); THE PHILOSOPHY
OF HEGEL 280-84, 325-29 (C. Friedrich trans. 1954).
36. C. DE VISSCHER, supra note 30, at 285-94.
37. Brierly severely criticized Vattel for his notion of States as individuals free and equal in a
state of nature without social bonds. J. BRIERLY, supra note 2, at 37-40. Some contemporary
scholars seek to render "translucent" what they criticize as the personification of the State to
allow international law to penetrate sovereignty thereby reaching individuals, as Hegel's State
would permit. D'Amato, The Relation of the Individual to the State in the Era of Human Rights,
24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (1989) (Bentham's sovereign power rather than Hegel's universal spirit
creates opaqueness); A. D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANAL-
YSIS OF LA- 116, 214, 240 (1984) (Hegel suggests universal personal relations are internally
embodied in the State); F. TEs6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY 55-75 (1988). Others, using Hegel and Gierke to justify the State, point out that
the State is more than a convenient fiction for sovereign authority or for the mechanical sum of
its personalized parts. They recognize the dialectic forces within a State to integrate national
decisions and relate to other States more efficiently as a corporate whole greater than the sum of
Winter 1991]
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Specific questions considering the attribution of omissions to the
State as conduct fall within the second attribution category, that of
State responsibility, which is the juridical idea that a State as a collec-
tive polity is held accountable for the wrongful conduct of those in
control of its affairs, as distinguished from that of the attribution of
injury to the collective polity of the State wronged. Situated within
this context, the following sections of this article examine and criti-
cally interpret specific contemporary practice for attributing official
failures and omissions as State conduct. A complex process, the anal-
ysis required for attributing failures and omissions reaches uncomfort-
ably into the heart of the working apparatus of the State and its power.
Attribution doctrine thus may be viewed within particular contexts as
a technical instrument for hiding or revealing assorted policy objec-
tives of the persons seeking effective control of the State's decision-
making apparatus and for distributing the benefits and burdens flow-
ing from omissions of a State.
Important nuances in attributing omissions to States have been in-
fluenced by the draft codification of State responsibility by the Interna-
tional Law Commission ("ILC"). The most recent reflection of State
practice, however, is found in two decisions of the World Court, deci-
sions of the Iran-United States Claims Commission, a 1983 report of
the Israeli Commission of Inquiry investigating the 1982 massacre in
Beirut and in emerging practice and decisions concerning disappear-
ances and other failures of protecting human rights such as inaction in
regard to death squads and loose controls over parastatal organiza-
tions or subordinate groups within national polities. This experience
requires us to rethink the conceptual framework for allocating respon-
sibility for wrongs between private or non-State conduct and public or
State omissions as conduct. 38
its parts. M. FROST, TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 167-
84 (1986). See H. LASKI, supra note 5, at 262. Laski himself sympathized with a cosmopolitan
stance viewing sovereignty and the Grotian States system as obsolete. Id. at 271-73. However,
he used social policy analysis rather than moral universalism to explain sovereignty. He wrote to
Holmes,
[S]overeignty in law really means nothing more than that the ultimate source of immediate
reference has spoken, where in politics we are dealing with the much less tangible factor of
influences. By responsibility I simply mean that if the state injures X more than it injures
the mass of men, unless a vital source of social interest is involved, the treasury ought to
assist X; and if it doesn't probably the control over officials is relaxed dangerously.
I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 191 (M. Howe ed. 1953). See also J. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD
ORDER 79-86 (1984) (criticizing Vattel's "sovereign dialectic" or interaction of purely autono-
mous States in nature without social bonds).
38. Christenson, supra note 3, at 321-23, 326-29 (postulating the two spheres and analyzing
the positive and negative duties associated with each).
(Vol. 12:312
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C. A Preliminary Appraisal
Critical review of this recent experience will show it to have nar-
rowed considerably the legal attribution of omissions of State under
international law. These technical shifts have substantive effect in sev-
eral ways not anticipated in an earlier study.39 First, recent normative
experience, with several exceptions,4° has introduced a new stringency
in applying the doctrine for the purpose of attributing conduct from
"official inaction.' ' 41 The new stringency, in effect an increased burden
on a claimant to show intentional State conduct from an omission,
validates loose reins on officials' affirmative international duties with-
out addressing the policy shift directly. Second, the decisions show
the extraordinary forbearance of decision-makers in attributing omis-
sions of State resulting from loose control over powerful subordinate
groups in the national polity, including non-State actors. Relaxation
of international duty to control an effective State power apparatus ap-
pears to follow. Paradoxically, these restrictive trends come at a time
when, as anticipated less than a decade ago, 42 greater State involve-
ment and cooperation might be required from crucial responsibilities
of governments to achieve important goals, subjecting both State or-
gans and non-State or private parties to greater control. Without re-
sponsible controls, the international community would have great
difficulty preventing environmental degradation, reducing terrorism
across borders or against aliens, preventing private violence against
minorities, stopping abuses of human rights and curtailing propa-
ganda-inspired mob or vigilante action against alien workers or hated
outsiders. Among the most important of public order concerns, Se-
curity Council measures and directives require the clearest coopera-
tion to control persons, events and things within a State's jurisdiction
(as in enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia or Iraq).
If the above interpretation from experience is accurate, the trends
show a shift from the objective to the. fault notion of responsibility
39. Id. at 335-58 (indicating a trend toward increasing responsibility for failure to meet af-
firmative international obligations through pressure from attribution theory).
40. See infra notes 149-62 and accompanying text (discussion of the Honduran disappear-
ance cases decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) and infra notes 122 and 215
(reflecting decisions attributing omissions in face of affirmative duties by the European Court of
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice of the European Community).
41. This term is adopted by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 207 comment c (1986) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The adoption
of this term reflects a judgment by the Reporters that customary international law regarding
attribution of omissions should be based upon "official" omissions, or conscious ones indicating
official fault, and a movement away from attributing omissions on the basis of objective failure of
duty irrespective-of intent or neglect. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
42. Christenson, supra note 3, at 340-41.
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through the techniques of intentionality and causation. This shift spe-
cifically reflects trends of an increase of effective power and influence
of intermediate and transnational institutions, an increase of local self-
determination in complex federal structures and an increase of collec-
tive national and regional responsibility to define clear substantive
obligations and affirmative duties cooperatively among States with va-
rying degrees of effective international or regional supervision within
domestic legal orders. It will also mean a greater burden in presenting
international claims, a further decline in the tort side of State responsi-
bility for injuries to aliens and an increase in the purely collective re-
sponsibilities of each State to all others (the public order side of State
responsibility), while leaving the administration of such responsibility
to internal treatment under loosening domestic control.
II. THREE PRINCIPLES FOR ATTRIBUTING
CONDUCT TO THE STATE
The State is not responsible to other States for every act or omis-
sion within its jurisdiction but only for conduct of those in control of
the power apparatus of the State. This separation of conduct of the
State from that of private or non-State persons, an entirely European
liberal development, became almost universal once feudal collective
responsibility receded. The central function of international law in
sustaining this separation has remained unquestioned. 43 The contem-
porary practice of responsibility of States under international law fol-
lows from this distinction.
Three principles, reflected in recent codifications and restatements,
summarize the tradition.44
A. Attribution for Actors in Effective Control
The first principle, a tautology, is that a State acts through people
exercising its machinery of power and authority. This principle means
that acts or omissions of official organs, agents or political subdivi-
sions, including those of successful revolutionary regimes, necessarily
are those of the State. These include acts of de facto agents under
direct control of those in power in a State or of those acting as govern-
ment in its absence. This principle developed its substance from the
protection of aliens during the 19th and 20th Centuries and is codified
in the draft articles and commentary on State responsibility of the ILC
43. C. DE VISSCHER, supra note 30, at 287.
44. Christenson, supra note 3, at 326.
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("ILC Draft Articles"). 45 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States46 and the 1961 Harvard Draft Conven-
tion on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens47 codify the same experience from an American perspective
building on earlier draft codifications.
B. Non-Attribution for Non-State Actors
The second principle, also tautological, is that international law
does not attribute conduct of non-State actors, such as acts or omis-
sions of private persons, mobs, associations, corporations, trade un-
ions, or unsuccessful insurgents, to a State. The ILC Draft Articles
make this principle explicit in articles 11 to 14.48 The Restatement
(Third) addresses it in commentary. 49 The Harvard Draft emphasizes
the independent duty upon the State to protect aliens and distinguishes
State conduct for failure of a duty from the actual acts of non-State
parties.50 The Harvard Draft also codifies a commercial act of State
exception from official conduct, using the restrictive view of sovereign
immunity to justify not attributing such commercial acts of a State
trading company, for example, to a State. 51
C. Attribution for Failure of Duty to Act
The third principle is that a State may act through its own in-
dependent failure of duty or inaction when an international obligation
requires State action in relation to non-State conduct. This principle
45. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session (5
May-25 July 1980), [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 2) 30-32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1980/Add. I (Part 2) (Draft Articles on State Responsibility) [hereinafter 1980 ILC Draft Arti-
cles]. Articles 5 and 6 cover conduct of State organs acting in that capacity, regardless of their
position in the State. Articles 7 and 8 cover attribution to the State of other entities and territo-
rial units, and of de facto acts of non-State persons in the absence of official authority. Article 9
attributes to a State acts of organs placed at its disposal by another State or by an international
organization (so-called indirect attribution, according to Ago). Article 10 covers acts or omis-
sions of organs or entities beyond their instructions or internal law.
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 41, at §§ 206, 207.
47. 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries
to Aliens, arts. 15-18 (Final Draft with Explanatory Notes 1961) (L. Sohn and R. Baxter report-
ers) [hereinafter Harvard Draft], reprinted in F. GARCIA-AMADOR, L. SOHN & R. BAXTER,
RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 133
(1974).
48. 1980 Draft Articles, supra note 45, at 31. Articles 11 to 14 define which acts are not
attributable to the State: acts of persons not acting for the State (either explicitly or de facto), acts
of organs of another State or international organization in a State's territory and acts of organs of
insurrectional movements.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 41, at § 207 comment c.
50. Harvard Draft, supra note 47, at 234-35, 238-39.
51. Id. at 253-56.
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properly is a corollary to the first principle, as the ILC Draft Articles
make clear. 52 For example, a State has a duty to take reasonable care
to protect foreign citizens from attack or harm and to apprehend and
punish offenders with due diligence.5 3 Inaction in the face of this duty
is conduct attributable to the State quite independently of the status of
the perpetrator of the immediate wrongful acts. The Restatement
(Third) specifically includes the principle of inaction of government as
a basis for attribution. The commentary would attribute to the State
"official inaction where there was a duty to act." 54 An example of this
duty is "to provide aliens reasonable police protection; the state is not
responsible for injuries caused by private persons that result despite
such police protection." 55 The ILC Draft Articles explicitly refer to
wrongful acts or omissions in article 3.56 Later commentary defines
conduct to include omissions where a duty to act derives from interna-
tional obligation. Article 11(2) preserves the possibility for attributing
conduct related to non-State action, but only for a State's independent
conduct in relation to it. That provision could include failure of duty
to protect aliens, for example, but the substance of the international
obligation creating such a duty is left to the primary rules of obligation
formed in customary international law or international agreement. 57
The principle reinforced in that article is foundational for attributing
conduct for failure to do any number of substantive affirmative duties,
ranging from protecting human rights to control over enterprises for
important purposes.58
III. THE STRUCTURE OF RECENT RESTATEMENTS OR DRAFT
CODIFICATIONS
A. Main Outlines for Attributing Conduct
The Restatement (Third) simplifies the above three principles into
just one section devoted to the attribution of conduct (the earlier edi-
52. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1974] 2 Y.B. Irr'L
L. COMM'N (pt. 1) 276, 277-90, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add. 1 (Part 1) (Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, commentary to articles 7-9) [hereinafter 1974 ILC Draft Articles].
53. Youmans Claim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 110 (1926). See generally Lillich,
Duties of States Regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens, 161 RECUEIL DES COURs 329 (1978-111).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 41, at § 207 comment c.
55. Id.
56. 1980 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 45, at 30.
57. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1975] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 59, 71, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1975/Add.I (Draft Articles on State Responsi-
bility) [hereinafter 1975 ILC Draft Articles].
58. Christenson, supra note 3, at 336-37.
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tion had two).59 Significantly, this most recent black-letter restate-
ment is organized not in the section on Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens, but in the earlier general section on Persons in In-
ternational Law, which also contains general responsibilities of States
to each other.6° Since States are the main persons or subjects of inter-
national law, this relocation is an important organizational change
roughly paralleling the separation of the conduct of subjects of inter-
national law from the wrongfulness of those acts in the eleven sections
of the draft codification prepared by Special Rapporteur and now In-
ternational Court of Justice Judge Roberto Ago under consideration
by the ILC.61 These sections of the Ago draft explicitly work through
the three principles and the distinction between State and non-State
conduct. The organizational and conceptual distinction both of the
Ago draft and the Restatement follows from a similar distinction be-
ginning in Roman law between the law of persons and the law of
obligations, the latter including both breach of contract and delict. So,
at least conceptually, the rules for determining responsibility and the
consequences and remedies that follow include both tortious wrongs
and breaches of agreement.
In contrast, the Sohn and Baxter Harvard Draft conceptually be-
gins with the wrongful act or omission causing injury to aliens and
then spells out when it is attributable to the State as part of an inte-
grated doctrinal presentation. 62 This concrete and specific approach,
following Garcia-Amador's initial attempt at codification63 (six sec-
tions on attribution) which was rejected by the ILC, emphasizes the
harm wrongfully done to individuals or persons by States rather than
focusing first on the abstract possibility of attributing conduct to
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 41, at § 207. Section 207 states:
A state is responsible for any violation of its obligations under international law resulting
from action or inaction by
(a) the government of the state,
(b) the government or authorities of any political subdivision of the state, or
(c) any organ, agency, official, employee, or other agent of a government or of any political
sub-division, acting within the scope of authority or under color of such authority.
Comment c explains that, "[i]n general, a state is responsible under international law only for
official acts, or for official inaction where there was a duty to act." Id.
60. Id. at § 206.
61. 1980 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 45, at 31 (Chapter II, "The 'Act of the State' Under
International Law" is separate from Chapter III, "Breach of an International Obligation").
62. Harvard Draft, supra note 47, at 247-60 (article 15 (Circumstances of Attribution); arti-
cle 16 (Persons and Agencies through Which a State Acts); article 17 (Levels of Government);
and article 18 (Activities of Revolutionaries)).
63. Responsibility of the State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of
Aliens-Reparation of the Injury, [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 46-47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1961/Add.1 (addendum, revised draft, articles 3-8).
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States as collective persons.64 It would not include breaches of
agreement.
The commentary to the ILC draft article 3 explains in circular
logic why Special Rapporteur Ago addresses first the formal possibil-
ity of defining the acts of States as subjects before defining the objec-
tive element of obligation. "[I]t is necessary to determine whether
State conduct exists," he states axiomatically, "before it can be deter-
mined whether or not it constitutes a breach of an international obliga-
tion."'65  Whether an omission is attributable conduct, however,
depends upon an international obligation by agreement or custom re-
quiring action in the circumstances. The substantive basis for obliga-
tion (whether fault, risk, well-being or the general security) thus
inescapably becomes the prior question for attributing omissions.
Showing an omission in the face of duty then becomes a highly subjec-
tive problem, quite belying Ago's objective theory, of proving intent
approaching malice in the neglect of duty. The formal separation of
the concept of State conduct from that of obligation thus anatomizes
international wrongs into pure abstractions that do not implement ex-
plicit community policy as much as support those who have taken
control of the apparatus of the State.
B. Doctrinal Development
So international responsibility depends largely upon political fac-
tors of organization of power within a State and a duty of effective
control over it.66 Traditional State responsibility doctrine, growing
from the protection of aliens, often considered the failure of duty as
part of the question of denial of justice, that is whether a State had
provided adequate protection or, in case of a crime against an alien,
had failed in the duty to apprehend or punish the perpetrators. 67
64. Harvard Draft, supra note 47, at 179-240. Articles 5 (Arrest and Detention), 6 (Denial of
Access to a Tribunal or an Administrative Agency), 7 (Denial of a Fair Hearing), 8 (Adverse
Decisions and Judgments), 9 (Destruction of and Damage to Property), 10 (Taking and Depriva-
tion of Use or Enjoyment of Property), 11 (Deprivation of Means of Livelihood), 12 (Violation,
Modification, or Annulment of Contract or Concession), and 13 (Lack of Due Diligence in Pro-
tecting Aliens) of the Draft all describe, in great detail, acts which constitute an international
wrong before the Draft addresses, in articles 15-18 (supra note 47), whether these wrongs are
attributable to the State.
65. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,[ 1973] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 161, 173, 179-84, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.1 (Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, commentary on article 3) [hereinafter 1973 ILC Draft Articles]. The logic of
priority begs the question of which omissions should be attributed, because an omission is con-
duct only in relation to substantive obligation. Christenson, supra note 3, at 325-26.
66. C. DE WISSCHER, supra note 30, at 285.
67. Neer Claim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 60 (1926); A. FREEMAN, supra note
33, at 8-21.
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When mobs attacked foreigners, any conduct attributed to the State
short of actually directing the mob attack is an omission of State aris-
ing from the particular circumstances. Traditionally, this omission in-
volves failure of the duty to take reasonable steps to protect the lives
and property of foreigners or to apprehend and punish offenders. 68 In-
jury from the omission becomes that of the injured alien's State.
An autonomous sovereign State, however, cannot be held responsi-
ble as a legal person for injuries by non-State actors unless its internal
processes do not meet international standards for protection or, except
where there is a breakdown of process due to civil strife, the State fails
to control a mob or militants. 69 The State acts by an omission if the
organized apparatus of the State as a whole fails in this minimum ex-
pectation owed to all other States. The fiction of attributing State ac-
tion when the internal process fails to meet civilized standards yields a
claim when nationals of another State (or even its own) suffer injury
and are denied justice after exhausting remedies. 70 Some commenta-
tors suggest outright that an omission should be judged by a subjective
standard of willful neglect, or fault, rather than an objective standard
of inaction. 71 When the injured State seeks to engage the responsibil-
ity of the State that wrongfully acts by omission, any ensuing responsi-
bility is satisfied by reparations or other settlement of the international
claim. 72
This doctrine of responsibility for injury to aliens and its assump-
tions encounters considerable difficulty in contemporary State prac-
tice, particularly after World War II. According to its most severe
critics, not only does the doctrine embody imperialistic tendencies of a
Eurocentric view of international law, but it shows little respect for
new and developing nations which use the standard that aliens should
receive treatment equal to that of nationals and no more.73 To these
critics, it seems hypocritical for a poor nation to be held responsible
68. Youmans Claim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 110 (1926); R. LILLICH, supra
note 29, at 8-21.
69. See Neer Claim, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 62 (separate opinion of Commissioner
Nielson).
70. See generally Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS, supra
note 3, at 1.
71. Supra notes 4 & 22; infra note 221. See Caire Claim (Fr. v. Mex.), 5 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 516 (1929).
72. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 199-200.
73. See generally, Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of
Universal International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961). See also R. ANAND, NEW STATES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-43 (1972); Falk, The New States and International Legal Order,
118 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 94-96 (1966-11).
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for treating foreign corporations and aliens better than its own when it
could not have any claim against the nations whose enterprises were
seen to exploit its people and resources.74 Under human rights doc-
trine, all nations would be held to the same standard, 75 and the need
for special protection of aliens would diminish. The emphasis of the
codifications reflects this shift, to the chagrin of some scholars who
lament a decline in effective international standards for human rights
including foreign minorities such as migrant workers and displaced
persons. 76
International responsibility for omissions, in its broadest contem-
porary setting, began with the decision of the International Court of
Justice in the Corfu Channel Case in 1949. 77 The Court held that Al-
bania was internationally responsible to the United Kingdom for fail-
ure to take all necessary steps to warn approaching ships of the danger
of mines some unknown actor placed near sealanes in Albanian terri-
torial waters. The omission was wrongful conduct, the Court con-
cluded, and Albania was responsible for the explosions and loss of life
and damage that resulted from the failure to maintain a monitoring
system and to send warnings.78 The Court inferred that Albania knew
of the minefields from indirect evidence of Albania's close surveillance
over the straits. 79 The Court here addressed an important burden of
proof. The mere fact of control over territory does not mean that a
State necessarily knew or ought to have known of an unlawful act
perpetrated within that territory or the identity of the parties involved.
Without more, that fact of control does not imply prima facie respon-
sibility or shift the burden of proof to the respondent State.
Exclusive territorial control often means, however, that the claim-
ant State might not be able to furnish direct proof of facts concealed
by the State in control. The element of exclusive control by Albania in
the circumstances, the Court concluded, does allow wider recourse to
inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. 80 The Court drew such
an inference of Albania's likely knowledge of the existence of the
74. Christenson, supra note 3, at 329.
75. Garcia-Amador's draft codification sought to achieve this result. See supra note 63.
76. Professor Lillich, for example, points out that apart from property claims, the rules for
protecting aliens have not received any criticism. Lillich, supra note 70, at 7-16. See also R.
LILLICH, supra note 29, at 119-24.
77. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment on Merits of Apr. 4).
78. Id. at 22-23.
79. Id. at 18.
80. Brownlie finds that there is no general burden on a claimant to prove attribution of an
omission, and that "no general presumption against attributability exists." I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 4, at 164-65.
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mines from circumstantial evidence of its probable surveillance activi-
ties. This inference of knowledge led directly to the obligation to no-
tify approaching ships of the danger, the failure of which was
attributed as an omission of Albania engaging its international respon-
sibility to the United Kingdom. This case broadened the obligation on
States to assume affirmative community-wide responsibilities in rela-
tion to other States. It generously expanded inferences that might be
drawn from the fact of control. This attribution of an omission of
State was inseparable from the factual context and a State's obligation
as a member of a society.
Following this decision and with the expansion of States in the
United Nations system after World War II, the International Law
Commission sought a comprehensive codification of the jurisprudence
of responsibility of States for all wrongs against each other, both col-
lectively and against individuals protected by international law.81 The
Corfu Channel Case figured prominently in the comprehensive ap-
proach toward contemporary State responsibility. In the influential
reports by Roberto Ago, as explained above, the question of what con-
duct may be attributed to the State became separated from the factual
context giving rise to duty to individuals or States. This formal doctri-
nal separation has had a more pervasive effect upon attributing omis-
sions than it has upon attributing official actions.
Severing the act of a State from obligations derived from primary
rules and isolating it within a secondary rule system defining conduct
and breach of international obligation spell conceptual trouble in de-
fining an omission as State conduct. These secondary rules express a
theory of various possibilities of subjective conduct by which a State
exercises its volition, thus defining what acts or omissions might possi-
bly be "willed" by the State. This subjective conduct then might en-
counter any number of possible substantive and objective norms of
international law, the primary substantive rules defining obligation.82
These primary obligations include both customary international law
and international agreements. If those in control of the State, for ex-
ample, simply remain supine in face of private threats and violence
81. The ILC rejected a first attempt by Garcia-Amador to codify State responsibility for the
protection of aliens and appointed then Professor Roberto Ago as rapporteur to prepare a com-
prehensive report and draft articles on the general law of State responsibility. R. LILLICH, supra
note 29, at 49-50.
82. See Combacau & Alland, "Primary" and "Secondary" Rules in the Law of State Respon-
sibility: Categorizing International Obligations, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 81 (1985). This division
should not be confused with H.L.A. Hart's primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of
recognition. The distinctions are clarified in Christenson, supra note 3, at 324-25 nn.23 & 27,
and Goldie, State Responsibility and the Expropriation of Property, 12 INT'L LAW. 63, 75-77
(1978).
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against a racial or national minority, the omission is State conduct
which breaches the primary rules of obligation of the State to take
reasonable steps to prevent private racial violence under international
law. The legal result would be to engage the international responsibil-
ity of that State through an omission of State. An entirely new legal
relationship follows from such "responsibility": another set of rules
defining a full range of legal consequences such as sanctions or reme-
dies including counter-measures, reparations, a claim to peaceful set-
tlement and satisfaction by apology. 3 The remedial side theoretically
would apply both to a delict and a treaty breach.84 This comprehen-
sive approach differs entirely from the more skeptical case-at-a-time
jurisprudential approach often referred to as the Anglo-American
method of international settlement of disputes in contrast to the Conti-
nental approach.8 5
Ago's work on State responsibility thus transformed earlier experi-
ence into a European-dominated codification in the Roman law tradi-
tion, powerfully influenced by a Kantian and Kelsenian set of a priori
assumptions. 86 The jurisprudential consequence is to increase the col-
lective power of a national polity over individuals and corporations
internal to it, in relation to other national polities, to meet interna-
tional obligations among States.87 It reduced the protection afforded
"aliens" under previous norms of customary international law in part
83. See 1973 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 65, at 179-84 (Roberto Ago's commentary to
article 3, where he sets out his organization for the comprehensive codification of state responsi-
bility). See also Alland, International Responsibility and Sanctions. Self-Defense and Counter-
measures in the ILC Codification of Rules Governing International Responsibility, in UNITED
NATIONS CODIFICATIONS OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 143 (M. Spinedi & B. Simma eds. 1987).
84. Mazzeschi, Termination and Suspension of Treaties for Breach in the ILC Works on State
Responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 83, at
57.
85. Writers in the Anglo-American tradition such as Brownlie, Goldie and Lillich have been
highly critical of the abstractness and usefulness of the ILC codification. I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 4, at 164; Lillich, supra note 70, at 20-21, 47 nn.170 & 171, 48-49 nn.176 & 177; Goldie,
supra note 82, at 65, 80; McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Aliens from Discrimina-
tion and World Public Order. Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 AM. J.
INT'L L. 432 (1976).
86. See Alland, supra note 83, at 171-72. See also Riphagen, State Responsibility: New Theo-
ries of Obligation in Interstate Relations, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY 581 (R. MacDonald & D.
Johnston eds. 1983).
87. An example is the Barcelona Traction Case which placed the organizing principle of State
injury on the State of incorporation of the injured foreign corporation and not on the State of the
minority shareholders. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment on Merits of Feb. 5). As Judge Jessup pointed out in his Separate Opinion, speaking
of an injured corporation "is really a bit of anthropomorphism since, as Sir Edward Coke re-
marked, corporations 'have no souls'.. . and as stated by more recent jurists, the corporation 'is
not a thing. It is a method.'... That corporations have a nationality is a legal fiction." Id. at 195
(citations omitted).
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by restructuring attribution doctrine and making diplomatic protec-
tion of aliens into a substantive or primary norm not the subject of
codification. This approach handled the problem of conflict between
the national treatment standard and the minimum standard for treat-
ment of aliens in international law by recognizing the primary norms
of human rights that national enforcement would provide for citizens
and foreigners alike.8 8 If a State failed in this obligation, responsibility
could arise either under customary international law of protection of
aliens or under the newer human rights norms.8 9
By separating attribution doctrine from .those obligations when
omissions are at issue, the codification allows important attribution
decisions to be decided separately from the factual context of duty to
States or individuals. 90 This separation strengthens the tendency to
convert attribution into an element of responsibility to be proved. 91 It
also converts into a preliminary question of proof the direct connec-
tion or linkage between omissions of particular State officials and the
claimed injury.92
IV. THE WORLD COURT REFINES THE DUTY
TO ACT OR CONTROL
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") relied more upon the
work of the International Law Commission than upon its own princi-
ples for attributing omissions laid down in the Corfu Channel Case
88. See R. LILLICH, supra note 29, at 48-56.
89. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
157-60 (1989) (disagreeing with Restatement (Third) that ultra vires violations of human rights
norms by officials are attributed to the State for harm to aliens, but not for injury to the State's
own nationals under customary international law); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 41, at
§ 702 comment b & Reporters' note 2. The Restatement is silent about attributing omissions of
State for failure of duty under customary international law in regard to human rights violations
of its own citizens. Presumably, where a clear duty is found in an international agreement, as in
recent decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (infra notes 151-54 and accom-
panying text) an official failure of duty would be attributed to the State under international law,
according to the Restatement, for violations of the human rights of its own citizens. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 41, at § 207(c) comment d & Reporters' note 4, § 71 l(a) com-
ments a-c.
90. Thus the substantive rules of primary obligation for State responsibility for omissions
causing injuries to aliens might differ in the effects of attribution from human rights violations of
citizens, mainly because the duty arising from the primary obligation is the measure for attribut-
ing an omission to the State. The Restatement (Third) suggests that the source for affirmative
duty when it involves a State's own citizens requires a treaty since customary international law
does not find adequate support in State practice. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 41, at
§ 711 comments a-c, e, & Reporters' note 2.
91. See an example of this tendency in the study on contributory fault developed by the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal. Bederman, Contributory Fault and State Responsibility, 30 VA. J.
INT'L L. 335 (1990).
92. Brownlie strongly disagrees with any attempt to convert "attribution" into an element of
a claim or a preliminary matter of proof. See supra note 80.
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when it applied attribution doctrine in the Hostages Case93 and the
Nicaragua Case.94 The first case dealt with whether either acts of mili-
tants in taking hostages or inaction in the face of duty could be attrib-
uted to the Revolutionary Government of Iran. The second case
attributed certain acts of covert operations to the United States while
acts of the Contra insurgency itself were not so attributed. Both deci-
sions dealt with the failure of duty or control by governments. The
first case considered briefly a duty to protect the embassy and diplo-
matic personnel in State territory and the alleged duty to control mili-
tants before their attack. The second case considered the control over
sponsored insurgents in another country insufficient to attribute con-
duct that violated obligations of non-intervention under international
law.
A. Hostages Case
The first World Court case to use the ILC draft codification in
supporting a decision of an attribution issue was the Hostages Case
brought by the United States against Iran. 95 The application sought to
secure release of hostages taken by militants in the American Embassy
during the chaotic days following the revolution in Iran. The U.S.
decision to permit the deposed Shah to enter the United States for
medical treatment was a key triggering event. The Court recognized
the acts of the militants in seizing the Embassy and in taking hostages
as conduct of the State of Iran but only after the initial non-State con-
duct was ratified by the new government and made its own.96
The Revolutionary Government's failure to protect the Embassy,
the diplomats and staff from the first attacks of the militants was an
omission of State, according to the decision, although the Court's deci-
sion gave much greater emphasis to the phase after governmental rati-
fication of the seizure.97 It did not attribute the failure of any duty to
93. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 29-
30 (Judgment on Merits of May 24) [hereinafter Hostages Case].
94. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 62-65 (Judgment on Merits of June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].
95. Although the Barcelona Traction Case developed the concept of responsibility erga
omnes, later used by the ILC, the attribution articles in part 1, chapter II of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility (articles 5 through 15) had not yet been accepted on first reading by the
Commission. 1980 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 45, at 30, 31-32.
96. Hostages Case, 1980 I.C.J. at 29-33.
97. Id. at 32. The Court stated that "[T]his inaction of the Iranian Government by itself
constituted clear and serious violation of Iran's obligations to the United States under the provi-
sions of ... the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations .. " Id. The Court had
earlier distinguished the non-attribution to Iran of the initiation of the attacks by the militants on
the Embassy and Consulates from Iran's own responsibility not to remain supine in the face of
"the most categorical obligations, as a receiving State, to take appropriate steps to ensure the
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protect the non-diplomatic or Embassy-related foreigners involved.
Initially, the Court decided, the acts of an armed band of militant stu-
dents were not acts of the State.98 The later approval and adoption by
the Ayatollah and government agencies of the militants' harmful acts
and the continuation of the militants' policies of seeking the return of
the Shah made the militants de facto agents of the State under princi-
ples codified in article 8 of the ILC draft codification. 99 Failure to
intervene to end the wrong after it occurred also was State inaction by
Iran because there was now an even clearer wrong and affirmative
duty to take steps to end the seizure by taking control and acting.lt°
These "repeated and multiple breaches of the applicable provisions of
the Vienna Conventions [were] even more serious than those which
arose from their failure to take any steps to prevent the attacks on the
inviolability of these premises and staff."101 The Court, however, did
not rest its holding and orders directly upon the failure to protect the
Embassy and its occupants under international obligations extant
before the occupation, despite its language indicating that the omission
of State itself violated these obligations. 102
The ICJ addressed a completely different attribution question
when it rejected the American argument that the Ayatollah's exhorta-
tions to his supporters to "expand with all their might" attacks against
the United States and Israel constituted an authorization by the Ira-
nian government to perform the specific act of invading and seizing
the American Embassy. The Court held that official approval subse-
quent to the event did not change the independent nature of the mili-
tants' initial seizure of the embassy.10 3 The Court, however, did
establish that once the Embassy had been seized, the Iranian Govern-
protection of the United States Embassy and Consulates, their staffs, their archives, their means
of communication and the freedom of movement of the members of their staffs." Id. at 29-30.
98. Id. at 29-30.
99. Id. at 33-35. The Court of Justice stated:
The result of that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation
created by the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular
staff as hostages. The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other
organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occu-
pation of the Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State. The militants,
authors of the invasion and jailers of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian
State for whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible. ...
Id. at 35.
Brownlie classifies such responsibility as that based upon "approval and adoption of harmful
acts," the main attribution holding of the Court. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 157-58.
100. Hostages Case, 1980 I.C.J. at 36.
101. Id. at 36.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 35-36.
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ment had a duty to make every attempt to bring the hostage situation
to a quick conclusion. The Ayatollah breached this duty by endorsing
the militants' conduct; not only did the Ayatollah refuse to order the
militants to end their embassy occupation, he forbade any government
officials from meeting the U.S. officials sent to Iran to negotiate the
release of the hostages. 1°4
As the case makes clear, there are two distinct legal concepts at
work. The first concept examines the nature of official action making
the non-governmental conduct the State's own. There were two parts
to this inquiry. One part questions whether the initial acts were de
facto sponsored and the other part questions the point at which non-
State acts were transformed into State action. The second legal con-
cept deals with omission of the State, the failure of the State's control-
ling elites to act to perform a duty required under international law to
protect the Embassy and personnel from attack. The Court found a
duty to protect in treaty provisions, but this duty prior to governmen-
tal ratification of the actions of the militants was not the main
emphasis of the opinion. Even less important was the customary in-
ternational law of State responsibility by which a State owes a duty of
reasonable care to protect foreigners from private violence and to exer-
cise due diligence to apprehend and punish persons committing such
acts. Failure of this customary duty is conduct attributable to the
State,'0 5 but the Court did not reach it, preferring, to ground duty in
international agreements protecting embassies, consulates and their
personnel. Prior to the time the Revolutionary Government approved
and adopted the action and policy of the militants, which transformed
the non-governmental conduct to that of the State, the new govern-
ment's failure to protect the Embassy and the diplomatic personnel as
well as aliens surely in circumstances of conscious neglect would have
been an omission of State attributable to Iran under customary inter-
national law and practice, even if no treaty obligations existed. The
Court did not place much emphasis on customary law in creating that
duty.
The conclusion that inaction amounts to an attributable omission
104. Id.
105. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 445-47 (3d
ed. 1979) ("[A] failure to take the appropriate steps to punish the culprits will ... give rise to
[State] responsibility."); B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNA-
TIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 218-32 (1987); H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 200 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1966) ("Under general international law the state is obliged to
employ due diligence to prevent [harm to aliens], and, if it is not possible to prevent [this harm],
to punish the delinquents .... ). See also Tanzi, Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Exist-
ence of an Internationally Wrongful Act? in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY, supra note 83, at 1, 3.
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of State when international law clearly imposes an affirmative obliga-
tion 10 6 should mean that there is no need for vicarious responsibility,
no need for any worry about "indirect" attribution and no need for the
fiction of transformation of the acts of the militants into those of the
State. Official inaction would entail a policy choice in deliberately re-
fusing an affirmative duty. Unless excused, the conduct would be as
directly attributable to the State as when a State approves and makes
the non-government action its own. The Court, however, resists at-
tributing conduct from such inaction without the clearest duty and the
clearest involvement of government. This reluctance loosens the ex-
pectation that government will control non-governmental actors and
mirrors a subtle rearrangement of power within a State's system.
Since the Court did require Iran affirmatively to protect the Em-
bassy after the militants' acts became those of Iran, 0 7 the only con-
duct of omission actually attributed to Iran as a result was tied
narrowly and closely to its continuing failure to act after it wrongfully
made the policies of the militants its own. The practical consequence
of this point becomes more apparent in the later decisions of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal which refused to extend the liberal evi-
dentiary principles of the Corfu Channel Case to inferences of omis-
sions in protecting private Americans from hostile Iranians that
otherwise might have been attributed to Iran. In effect, at least in
cases involving the protection of aliens from the excess fervor of a suc-
cessful revolution, the burden of attributing omissions to the State
through liberal inferences from evidence has become a presumption
against attribution for such failures. This presumption against attrib-
uting omissions of State can be overcome only by meeting an exacting
special burden of proof, precisely the opposite of Brownlie's conclu-
sions about where the attribution burden lay.' 0 8
B. Nicaragua Case
Nicaragua brought the second recent World Court case that ad-
dressed the attribution of omissions or failure to control. The case
involved the United States' responsibility for the Contras' insurgency
in Nicaragua as well as for the mining of a harbor and other acts of
intervention including the distribution of a guerilla manual. The
106. The Court, in both the Hostages Case and Nicaragua Case, took note of treaties which it
could have used to establish such a duty. See Treaty on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,
Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024; Treaty of Amity, Eco-
nomic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S.
No. 3853.
107. Hostages Case, 1980 I.C.J. at 30-33.
108. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 164-65.
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Court held non-attributable to the United States the acts of the Con-
tras during their insurgency in Nicaragua, though supported by mili-
tary and other assistance from the United States. 1°9 The opinion
found that Nicaragua did not present sufficient evidence that the
United States controlled the specific military operations of the insur-
gency.' 10 The Court also found insufficient evidence of U.S. involve-
ment in the financing and tactical and strategic planning of Contra
attacks. Even if the United States "generally controlled" the Contras
and the Contras were "highly dependent" on the United States, this
fact in itself would not mean that Contra acts were attributable to the
United States, according to the decision."' In order for Contra con-
duct to be attributable, the U.S. government would have had to pos-
sess effective control of the Contras at the time the disputed activities
occurred and to direct the particular actions. 112
The CIA-directed mining of Nicaraguan harbors and attacks on
ports and oil installations, on the other hand, as well as the prepara-
tion and distribution of a guerilla manual were acts of agents com-
pletely controlled by the U.S. government and thus attributable to
it.113 These were independent acts of the United States under princi-
ples of customary international law contained in ILC draft article
11(2). 114 Acts of the Contras using the instructions in the CIA man-
ual on psychological guerilla warfare encouraging the commission of
unlawful acts were not attributable to the United States, since the evi-
dence did not show sufficient control and authorization of the non-
State group as required under ILC draft article 8.11 The acts, there-
fore, were those of non-State persons not acting on behalf of the
United States, under ILC draft article 11(1). 116 The Court did not
address (although Judge Ago in concurrence suggested the analysis)
whether the United States might have acted by failing in its affirmative
obligation to keep control over conduct of the Contras. 117 Such an
109. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 65 (Judgment on Merits of June 27).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 64-65.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 48-51, 65.
114. 1980 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 45, at 31. Article 11(2) acknowledges that a State
can be responsible for the actions of persons who are not officially part of a governmental organ.
In this particular instance, article 11(2) resolves any potential inconsistency between article 11(1)
and article 8.
115. Id.; see also Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 68, 148.
116. 1980 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 45, at 31.
117. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 190 (Ago, J., separate opinion).
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analysis is surely, a conceit, for evidentiary inferences about United
States' intentions and its effective control easily were available.
C. Appraisal: The Archaeology of Power
These two cases suggest a shift in attribution doctrine underway
within the International Court of Justice, especially a retreat from the
humanitarian principles of responsibility based upon liberal inferences
from inaction of those in exclusive control, as set out in the Corfu
Channel Case. I " In each of the two more recent attribution cases, the
noticeable development is the Court's greater reluctance to attribute
conduct from failure of duty to protect or control. State responsibility
means that conduct must flow from the exercise of power by the active
will of those in control of the State, causing harm in breach of an
international obligation through a close linkage of volition and injury.
In a rhetorical sense, the decisions simply reaffirmed long standing
custom and practice.119 In another sense, by its reluctance to rely
upon inference and rebuttable presumptions to find volitional acts of
State power from inaction by State leaders, the Court increases its tol-
eration for tacit exercise of State power by non-State actors, absent the
most explicit duty or connection.1 20
Ironically, a similar, more exacting standard for attributing omis-
sions as State conduct has been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court,
thus moving in a direction opposite from that of the European com-
118. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. In the Corfu Channel Case, even though
Britain could not present direct evidence that the Albanians actually knew about the mines to
give adequate warnings, the Court allowed liberal indirect evidence to create inferences of knowl-
edge from which a duty to notify arose. The omission in the face .of such knowledge and duty
was attributable to Albania. Corfu Channel Case (U.K v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 21-22 (Judgment
on Merits of Apr. 9). Judge Alvarez, in his concurrence, proposed six guidelines for future
courts to consider when attempting to assess responsibility for omissions. Collectively, these
guidelines would impose a duty on States to eliminate or contain any prejudicial or criminal acts,
and maintain a vigil against any danger to the rights of any alien. Id. at 44-46 (Alvarez, J.,
concurring). Brownlie analyzed this kind of responsibility as deriving from the "provenance of
harm and the failure to exercise proper control." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 153. The Hon-
duran disappearance cases have refined and applied this concept, but trends of recent decisions
involving aliens apply a much stricter standard for attributing conduct to the State for an
omission.
119. In the Hostages Case, although the Court does attribute omissions to Iran, the court
does not attribute full responsibility to Iran until the government approved and adopted the
policies and acts or omissions of non-State actors. Hostages Case, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Judgment on
Merits of May 24) (" [F]ailure on the part of the Iranian authorities to oppose the armed attack
by militants ... [and] the almost immediate endorsement by those authorities of the situation
thus created," constitute acts which are attributable to Iran).
120. Some scholars argue that the practice of requiring an act of the State, rather than
stressing the State's duty to hold to stricter account private actions violating human rights,
should be clarified to enforce international obligations upon private persons. See T. MERON,
supra note 89, at 162-71.
Winter 1991]
Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 12:312
munity. 121 In a narrow construction of conduct attributable as "state
action" under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the
Supreme Court denied that a State acts by inaction for the purpose of
determining a constitutional wrong, unless there is a clear affirmative
duty by State law or through a special relationship between the State
and the plaintiff.122 The Restatement expresses a similar concept for
attributing official inaction only in the face of a duty. 123
The shift loosens the reins international law requires for control-
ling internal conduct and erodes the distinction between public and
private or non-governmental conduct. It invites a State to exercise in-
sidious control over private or non-governmental actors by subtle indi-
rection. At the same time, it may mirror a diminution of actual power
in a central government and invite non-State actors to assert control
without international public responsibility.
Communitarians and post-Marxists have long sought to obliterate
the distinction between the public and the private spheres, in part at
121. See Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A
Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 873 (1990).
122. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Chief
Justice Rehnquist for the majority explains as mistaken the notion that a state has an implicit
constitutional duty to care for a child and that failure of the social services agency to intervene to
prevent child abuse by a custodial parent, even with notice of its likelihood, imposes any liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors."
Id. Without an explicit statutory or common law duty to protect the person, the state has no
responsibility for a constitutional wrong. Explicit duties could arise also because a person has a
special relationship with the state, such as incarceration, commitment in a state hospital or child
custody under state law. Justice Brennan's dissent reasoned from the same premises as found in
international jurisprudence, that "inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action .... Id.
at 212.
Professor Shelton suggests that if the United States "were ever to deteriorate into the kind of
political violence that terrorizes many countries throughout the world with disappearances, sum-
mary executions, and torture, the government would be immune from responsibility unless the
private conduct" received the imprimatur of the State. Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs,
and the Responsibility of States, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 30 (1989-1990). Her point shows the
conceptual similarity between the approval and adoption reasoning behind the actual holding in
the Hostages Case and the reluctance of the Supreme Court to attribute omissions to the State.
Would the constitutional or international responsibility for omissions be any different were the
United States to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights that contains affirmative
obligations? As Shelton speculates further, might an alien receive greater protection under cus-
tomary international law of State responsibility for a government's failure to protect in the face of
duty than American citizens? Id. at 33. This conclusion seems doubtful in the light of trends
and burdens of proof analyzed in the present article for attributing omissions to States. See also
Christenson, supra note 3, at 341.
Professor Strossen compares this denial of affirmative duty to the quite different European
experience, noting that affirmative duties in protecting human rights are recognized as such in
decisions by both the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of
Human Rights. Failure in meeting duties implied from the Rome Treaty and from the European
Convention on Human Rights are considered omissions attributed to a State, for which responsi-
bility attaches under the treaties, a trend markedly opposite to that of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Strossen, supra note 121, at 846-49, 873.
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 41, at § 207 comment c.
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least to rein in private violence and class exploitation. They seek to
demystify the artifacts of legal myth protecting the powerful and dom-
inant private spheres of money and power sustained under an "objec-
tive" and "formal" legal system.1 24 The doctrine of attribution for
omissions under international law points out the dilemmas in this ide-
ological critique of the rule of law in liberal thought. Which sphere
will swallow the other through legal technology such as technical
shifts of burdens of proof and presumptions? Which sphere of power
benefits most from the application of intentionality or volition (fault)
required if an omission is attributed fictionally to the legal personality
of a State? On the one hand, boundaries are realigned in favor of non-
State power by more exacting scrutiny over duties upon governments
and their inaction. On the other, power of those who keep control by
tacitly relying upon non-State actors might be increased even more.
Interestingly, the perceived reluctance (or inability) by the interna-
tional community to supervise these instruments of control becomes
what Michel Foucault describes as part of a larger archeology of
power, a complex merger of the public and the private from within. 125
The boundary question itself becomes meaningless, for non-State
power (economic, religious, social) arranges itself, accomodates itself
to the loose reins and forms tacit reciprocal relationships not unlike
124. For an excellent review of the issues and literature, see LAW AND THE COMMUNITY:
THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM? (A. Hutchinson & L. Green eds. 1989) (containing papers and
articles of thoughtful scholars appraising contemporary critical theory about rival traditions such
as communitarianism, classical liberalism and the public and private spheres).
125. See Foucault, Afterword.- The Subject and Power to H. DREYFUS & P. RABINOW.
MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208 (2d ed. 1983). We
study power to imagine "what we could be to get rid of this kind of 'double bind,' which is the
simultaneous individuation and totalization of modem power structures." The major problem
"is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to
liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state.
We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality
which has been imposed on us for several centuries." Id. at 216.
For Foucault, the exercise of power "is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon
possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it
constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject
or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other
actions." Id. at 220. Foucault views power as government in the broad meaning it had in the
sixteenth century, not just political structures or management of States, but "the way in which
the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls,
of communities, of families, of the sick .... To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible
field of action of others." Id. at 221. In this sense of government, power relations have been
progressively "elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of,
state institutions." Id. at 224. As in the radical critique of liberalism, action or inaction in the
private sphere has connection in institutions controlled by the State through alternating State
omissions or actions. These are strategies of struggle perpetually confronting and keeping a rela-
tionship of domination and resistence "in a massive and universalizing form, at the level of the
whole social body." Id. at 226. See Turkel, Michel Foucault.- Law, Power, and Knowledge, 17 J.
L. & Soc'Y 170 (1990).
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feudal arrangements with those ostensibly controlling the State. One
of the founders of the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin, saw clearly
by metaphor and experience the modem world's destruction of pri-
vacy, the tendency to break down the barriers between the public and
the private spheres. To illustrate, he used the experience of seeing
"bull's-eye windows in the closets" in Germany. One cannot hide in
closets.126 The symbol of this arrangement seen through technical at-
tribution doctrine is the problem of omissions of those in control of the
State in the face of expectation (or duty). To be freer from the expec-
tation of action for some end of the larger community reduces respon-
sibility upon public officials and leads to pluralistic bargains among all
with power.
Eliminating boundaries thus does not necessarily favor human
freedom or dignity; nor does it hold actual power responsible in times
of emergency. My argument pushes such a contradiction into attribu-
tion doctrine to show that the dialectic tension introduced in State
responsibility between the public and private spheres favors resolution
not through eliminating the boundaries between the spheres, but in
keeping them in order to hide actual power and effective control of the
apparatus of State within the private sphere partly through the device
of non-attribution of an omission or the deniability of the wink and the
nod. Similarly, power escapes attribution in the avoidance of interme-
diate responsibility where a parastatal or other subordinate entity has
more power, de facto, than the central organs of State. Classic liber-
alism in State responsibility thus is transformed into a tool for those in
effective control of the State to use to maintain power "without attri-
bution" so to speak.127
Moreover, if State organs themselves are in fact controlled by para-
statals, non-governmental power centers such as solidarity, religious
or enterprise elites, the principle codified in ILC draft article 8 pro-
vides a basis for attributing conduct through the test of de facto con-
trol. 2  Under the analysis of the International Court of Justice, non-
126. For a reconstruction of Benjamin's philosophy, see S. BUCK-MORSS, THE DIALECTICS
OF SEEING: WALTER BENJAMIN AND THE ARCADES PROJECT (1989).
127. Professor Lobel, for example, describes the "struggle to revive the dichotomies of liberal
thought... [as] contradictory." The separation of the public and private spheres confines totali-
tarian government to crisis periods, he argues. Weakening the boundaries by continual emer-
gency crises thus increases the "grave danger of authoritarian rule." When we revive the
dichotomies of liberal thought such as inspired by Gorbachev's restructuring (Yeltsin's liberal
agenda seems more apt), we must also recognize that the "restriction of emergency powers ulti-
mately requires the abandonment of the dualistic model." Lobel, Emergency Power and the De-
cline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1433 (1989).
128. 1980 ILC Draft ILC Articles, supra note 45, at 31 (article 8). Article 8 reads:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act of the State
under international law if:
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governmental conduct similarly would be attributable to a State only if
it in fact acts for or controls in place of government. Neither the mili-
tants in Iran nor the Contras in Nicaragua were found to have acted as
government, for they were insufficiently shown to have been controlled
by government and thus did not act in its place. Whom did they act
for, then? Can it be maintained without cynicism that neither were
part of the power apparatus controlled by or controlling the respon-
dent States? Why should it not be enough that those in power could
have acted but failed to take action to fulfill international obligations
or expectations? Framed that way, the question whether volitional
forbearance or inadequate control is independent conduct attributable
to the State would depend only upon clear affirmative international
obligation to act and adequate power to act. Otherwise, the clearest
interpretation suggests that the State's system, whose law is adminis-
tered at least in part by the International Court of Justice, reinforces
tacit control by those in fact in power in the sense Foucault saw.t29
V. OTHER RECENT DECISIONS ON ATTRIBUTING
OFFICIAL INACTION
A. Wrongful Expulsion Cases of Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal
One observes a most notable reluctance to attribute omissions of
State in certain decisions by Chambers of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. This important category of attribution cases asks
whether allegedly coercive techniques of expulsion of Americans from
Iran was conduct attributable to Iran for the purpose of determining
responsibility under the terms of the Algiers Accords. 30 In general,
the Tribunal has been very reluctant to attribute conduct to Iran for
failure to control the threats against Americans from non-State actors
without the clearest linkage of such acts to the revolutionary
government. 13'
(a) it is established that such persons or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of that
State; or
(b) such person or group of persons was in fact exercising elements of the governmental
authority in the absence of the official authorities and in circumstances which justified
the exercise of those elements of authority.
129. See supra note 125. See also Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987) for the use of linguistic techniques of legal doctrine
to sustain pervasive attitudes of power through professional subjectivities (as in non-attribution).
130. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 3 (Feb. 1981) [hereinafter
Algiers Accords].
131. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 92 (1987); William L. Pereira
Assoc., Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 198 (1984). In both of these cases
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In Rankin v. Iran,t 32 the Tribunal decided that, even though the
general policy of the revolutionary Iranian government violated inter-
national obligations in the treatment of Americans, as expressed both
in the treaty of amity and under customary international law, to hold
Iran internationally responsible the claimants needed to show that the
wrongful conduct could be attributed to Iran by identifying directives
of specific agents of the revolutionary government expelling the Amer-
icans.' 33 The Tribunal did not find evidence of such conduct attribu-
table to Iran and did not reach the question of whether Iran was
responsible to the claimant for the resulting loss of his property.1 34
A different Chamber of the Tribunal had earlier applied similar
reasoning over American Judge Brower's vigorous dissent. In Short v.
Iran, 35 the fact that the claimant left Iran because violence and disor-
der accompanied the revolution did not make the new government re-
sponsible for the departure, according to the Tribunal. The new
government, coming to power by revolution, is responsible for the
wrongful acts of the successful revolutionaries who seized power.136
In this case, however, the claimant had left Iran before the formal
establishment of the new government. More important, he could not
identify any acts of agents specifically imputable to the successful rev-
olutionary faction nor rely on a general duty of the old regime to pro-
tect aliens from private violence during the revolution. 37 The new
government might have been responsible for injuries suffered by the
claimant as a result of his sudden departure from Iran, but only if the
expulsion were linked to agents of the successful revolution before it
became the government. The burden lay upon the claimant.
Iran was held responsible for the expulsion of the Americans because the claimants could present
evidence of specific acts of the revolutionary government which led directly to the injuries alleged
by the claimants. But see Leach v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 440-12183-1 (Oct. 6,
1989) (WESTLAW, INT-IRAN database); Arthur Young & Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 245 (1987); Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 135
(1987); Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 76 (1987); Sea-Land Service, Inc.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 149 (1984). In each of these last five cases, the
claimant could not present evidence of specific acts of the revolutionary government, and the
tribunal refused to attribute the causation of the injuries to Iran based solely on general allega-
tions of misconduct on the part of Iranian citizens. The tribunal also refused to assign any
affirmative duty to the Iranian Government to protect American citizens, even though the
United States and Iran had signed a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights
in 1955 which placed a duty on Iran to protect Americans in Iran. Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United States of America and Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 8
U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
132. Rankin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 135, 147-48, 151 (1987).
133. Id. at 147-48, 151.
134. Id. at 151-52.
135. Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 76, 83-84 (1987).
136. Id. at 83-84.
137. Id. at 85.
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In the Yeager case,138 however, the Tribunal shifted the burden by
creating a rebuttable presumption that the "Komitehs" or "Guards"
were acting on behalf of the revolutionary government and thereby
attributed those actions to Iran under principles codified in article 8 of
the ILC draft articles.1 39 The claimant met a strict initial burden
showing that his departure was forced by specific members of the Rev-
olutionary Guards after the new government formally took power.
This narrow factual showing distinguished the claim from those forced
expulsions occurring before the revolutionary movement became the
government. The Tribunal held Iran responsible for conduct attribu-
table after, but not necessarily before, the revolution. 14° Under cus-
tomary international law codified in the ILC draft, wrongs attributable
to a successful revolutionary movement also would become those of
the State. While the Short case recognized this principle, the Tribunal
viewed quite skeptically the evidentiary link between the movement
and the conduct. It did not address whether a revolutionary move-
ment itself has a duty to protect or whether a failure to protect is
attributable as an omission of State of the revolutionary government if
successful.' The failure of either the movement or the government to
control the non-State actors or the failure of duty by either to protect
aliens from expulsion did not receive much serious attention.
In summary, the Tribunal required exacting proof of conduct at-
tributable to the revolutionary government both before and after the
revolution's success. Anti-American propaganda by the Ayatollah
might have been attributed to Iran. However, the link between.this
conduct and the acts of non-State groups in leading to the expulsion of
Americans would have to be established without any help from infer-
ences leading to rebuttable presumptions, unless direct orders could be
traced back to the leadership. Moreover, the Tribunal decided no
cases on any clear affirmative duty to control mob action enflamed by
propaganda against Americans. Thus, no conduct was attributed to
Iran from its failure to protect, despite customary international law
codified in the Ago draft, citing decisions of mixed claims tribunals
under special settlement agreements. As evidence of custom, these de-
cisions offer only limited utility in establishing a general affirmative
duty on governments and insurgencies alike to protect outsiders from
mobs. The particular context of the compromis would define such du-
ties. The special context of the Algiers Accords and the political
events leading to it also might have reflected a different standard of
138. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 92, 94-95, 103 (1987).
139. Id. at 94-95, 103.
140. Id. at 105-07.
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affirmative protection or duty for purposes of the settlement of claims.
Careful scrutiny of the sources for affirmative duty and stringent proof
dominate especially in the special context where customary affirmative
duties simply were not invoked.
Ago's concurrence in the Nicaragua Case helps clarify the confu-
sion surrounding attribution in the Tribunal's decisions. The concur-
rence shows clear disagreement with some Tribunal opinions in the
attempted use of indirect attribution to suggest a kind of vicarious re-
sponsibility for acts of non-State actors. Ago is correct in rejecting
that usage, in my view, for two reasons. First, that kind of analysis is
inconsistent with the ILC's codified definition. Indirect attribution in
the framework of the ILC Draft Articles is between States, where con-
trol of acts of one country is exercised through a third country. This
usage is not a form of vicarious responsibility for acts of private
mobs.' 41 Second, Ago's concurrence implies a rejection of the Tribu-
nal's misuse in legal theory of what should be left to moral philosophy,
namely the concept of intentionality, where results not intended di-
rectly from actions should have less culpability than those directly in-
tended. As repeatedly seen, results from inaction very well may be
intended.
A correct application of Ago's approach would be that the failure
of a clear duty to control a directly inflamed mob should constitute
direct conduct. There would be no need to reach either for a fiction of
"indirect" or vicarious responsibility or for the "constructive expul-
sion" fiction cogently argued as the alternative by Judge Brower of the
Tribunal in his dissent in the Short case. The better view would agree
with Ago's objective theory of a linkage of harm to a failure of objec-
tive duty without any such fiction. Under this kind of analysis, the
Tribunal, with some factual inferences drawn from the fact of the
Ayatollah's control, should have concluded either that the State acted
by omission in its failure of affirmative duty to prevent private coer-
cion leading to expulsion under international law or that the non-State
group acted under the effective control of the revolutionary leader.
Neither conclusion would be an "indirect" attribution.1 42 Either
could follow from the objective theory, eliminating a subjective moral-
ity whose use simply increases the difficulty of showing individual
moral culpability and then transferring it to the State.
141. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 188-89 (Judgment on Merits of June 27).
142. In Short v. Iran, after invoking the ILC Draft Articles, the Tribunal framed the prelimi-
nary issue as whether the "facts invoked by the Claimant as having caused his departure from
Iran are attributable to Iran, either directly, or indirectly as a result of its deliberate policies, or
whether they reveal a lack of due diligence in meeting Iran's international duties towards the
Claimant." Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 76, 83 (1987).
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If Iran owed an affirmative duty under customary international
law or the amity treaty to prevent non-State groups from driving
Americans from Iran, a difficult duty to establish under the rigorous
standard of the Hostages Case, Ago's analysis might very well have led
to Brower's conclusion. Under the Ago approach, moreover, the con-
structive expulsion argument is probably an application of ILC draft
article 8(a), that the non-State actors in fact or presumptively were
acting on behalf of Iran. 143 Applying the objective theory, the ILC
commentary states that the article encompasses two situations, both
involving a real link between the State machinery and non-State ac-
tors. The first situation is where the State or State organ "instructs"
the private persons to act. The second situation is where the State or
State organ "prompts" private persons to act.'"
Does inciteful propaganda emanating from the Ayatollah suffi-
ciently "prompt" the enflamed private Iranian citizens during the
revolution to drive out the Americans? Here Ago's concurrence in the
Nicaragua Case clarifies the difference between the State's independent
acts and the acts of non-State groups. The concurrence criticizes the
World Court opinion for sloppy reasoning in reaching the conclusion
that the United States was not responsible for the acts of the Contras.
He points out that the United States' action in producing a guerilla
manual inciting insurgent action quite properly is attributable to the
United States as such, independent of the Contras' acts. Attribution of
such independent conduct to the United States, however, was not ex-
tended to the acts of the Contras without a much stricter link of con-
trol and direction of their specific acts to the power apparatus of the
U.S. government. 45
Similarly, in one of the Tribunal's cases the Ayatollah's inciteful
propaganda was attributed to Iran as such, quite independent of the
action of private persons. The Ayatollah's powerful tirades, indepen-
dently attributable to Iran, may very well have prompted and effec-
tively controlled private acts directed against Americans leading to
their expulsion from Iran, but the link between that incitement and the
private action had to be established with particularity. 46 In some
cases it was; in others it was not. Calling the ouster "constructive
143. See Cove, State Responsibility for Constructive Wrongful Expulsion of Foreign Nationals,
11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 802 (1988) (reviewing the customary international law of unlawful ex-
pulsion of foreign nationals, including attribution to the State, and concluding that even without
official orders from leaders of a successful revolutionary movement a "nation should be responsi-
ble when a mob, moved by state-inspired propaganda, forces aliens to leave the country.").
144. 1974 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 52, at 283 (commentary to article 8).
145. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 188-90. '
146. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 92, 103 (1987).
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expulsion" giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of wrongful con-
duct may be a useful analogy to a common law fiction, but the analytic
construct still requires focus on the connection between the incitement
and the acts themselves to provide an adequate linkage to the machin-
ery of the revolution. By rejecting Judge Brower's attempt to shift the
burden to Iran to rebut the presumption that the Ayatollah prompted
or instructed the expulsions carried out by non-State parties, the deci-
sions demonstrate the increased demands of proof before attributing
clever or sophisticated action or inaction to a State.147 Inferences pos-
sible under the Corfu Channel Case were eliminated, making attribu-
tion now an element of the claim even under the objective theory.
This claim must now be sustained as an independent legal assertion by
a burden of proof without assistance of inferences drawn from factual
circumstances or control.
The decisions thus confirm the general trend that claimants or
their nations'espousing claims must show a direct causal link to con-
duct of an agent of the State, not merely inaction in the face of duty,
before action will be attributed to the State.14 The decisions tend tac-
itly to recognize the legitimacy of increased power of governments and
successful revolutionary regimes to achieve State policy objectives
through non-State conduct.
B. Disappearances Cases
Non-governmental death squads in some countries have systemati-
cally eliminated political opposition by the tragic terror of torture, ar-
147. Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 76, 89-93 (1987) (Brower, J.,
dissenting).
148. See D. Caron, Attribution Amidst Revolution: The Experience of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law on March 29, 1990). Professor Caron focuses on the Tribunal's application of the
ILC draft articles to the Iranian revolution. The Tribunal found that, in accordance with article
15, acts of revolutionaries which led to the establishment of The Islamic Republic of Iran were
attributable to the Republic. However, the acts of other revolutionary sects were not attributable
to the Republic. Id. at 9 (citing Short, 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. at 84-85). Ago's Commentary to
Article 15 states that "it is legitimate to attribute to a government resulting from a successful
revolution the injurious acts committed earlier by the revolutionaries .... " 1975 ILC Draft
Articles, supra note 57, at 104. The Tribunal, as Caron points out, established very stringent
standards of proof which had to be met before the Tribunal would accept the connection between
an expulsion of a claimant and the Iranian government. Caron, supra, at 17. Imposing a strict
standard of proof may have kept within the letter of the ILC draft, but made it almost impossible
for claimants to prove that the revolutionaries who wronged them were under instructions from
the leaders who became the new government. The Tribunal found no acts or omissions before
the formal establishment of The Islamic Republic attributable to the Republic. Clearly, however,
the Ago draft did not mean that successful revolutionaries should be presumed free of responsi-
bility for their acts as revolutionaries, unless the strict standard of proof means a substantive
move toward no attribution for acts of successful liberation movements. See, e.g., Atlam, Inter-
national Liberation Movements and International Responsibity, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICA-
TION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 83, at 35.
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bitrary killings and forced or involuntary disappearances. 149 This
conduct may not be directed by any official action but is achieved
nonetheless by a form of omission of State, perhaps by the averting of
eyes by responsible government officials, if not by outright collusion
through winks and nods. Tacit approval or complicity by officials un-
questionably would be conduct attributable to the State as a breach of
human rights law or, possibly, as a crime of a State against its own
citizens.150 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently de-
cided three cases involving disappearances. In two cases the Court
found Honduras responsible for the acts of officers or persons acting
under orders from officers of the State.' 5' In the Fairdn Garbi and
Sohi Corrales Case, the Court found insufficient evidence to relate the
disappearances to the governmental practice of disappearances and de-
cided in favor of Honduras. 5 2 Language in the opinions, however,
emphasized the affirmative duty under the American Convention on
Human Rights to protect specified human rights, and that a corre-
sponding failure to protect these rights could be attributed to a
State. t 53 In contrast with the stringent proof required by the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal in the wrongful expulsion cases, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights developed well-reasoned pre-
sumptions and burdens of proof to provide the evidentiary basis for
inferences linking government complicity in the disappearances. 54
Now, suppose that the link to government is much more difficult
to show, as when the wink and the nod denoting approval is neither
traceable nor easily presumed from the fact of control, and that au-
thorities wish the work of assassination or terrorist squads to be seen
149. Many cases have been documented by Amnesty International and are reported in the
press from time to time. A recent example involves death squads killing juveniles in Brazil.
Killing of Brazil Youths Reported, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1990, at A8, col. 3.
150. See T. MERON, supra note 89, at 159-71; Berman & Clark, State Terrorism. Disappear-
ances, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 531 (1982); Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens
Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217, 225-31 (1977); Shelton, supra note 122,
at 32-33.
151. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 91 (ser.
C) No. 4 (1988); Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CTr. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 85 (ser.
C) No. 5 (1989); Fairin Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND
JUDGMENTS 73 (ser. C) No. 6 (1989). See also Shelton, supra note 122, at 12-14.
152. Fairin Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS at 134-36.
153. The disappearance cases each make this point, as summarized by Shelton, supra note
150, at 5-14.
154. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS at 140-44;
Godhez Cruz, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS at 128-33; Fairdn Garbi, IN-
TER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS at 119-24, 129-36. See also Shelton, supra note
21, at 382-84 (initial burden on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, shifting to
the government to refute allegations, with failure to come forward creating from silence a pre-
sumption of truth of allegations).
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as the work of non-State vigilantes or private terrorists.' When the
objects of such omission are foreigners, the State has a clear affirma-
tive duty under customary international law to protect against crimi-
nal acts and may be held responsible for failure of a reasonable duty of
protection. 15 6 More often, the victims are nationals of the country as
well as foreigners. In these cases, the separation of attribution doc-
trine from the responsibility of States for the protection solely of aliens
provides a basis for international responsibility for crimes or violations
of human rights. 1 7 Failure to protect citizens from "private" death
squads in these systematic disappearances by doing nothing or by fail-
ing to exercise due diligence in apprehending and punishing clearly
should be attributed as an omission of State. 158
In the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights drew upon attribution doctrine developed as custom-
ary international law, but applied it to an affirmative obligation of
Honduras under the American Convention on Human Rights to pro-
tect the specified human rights of its own citizens as well as those of
aliens. Under the clearest of affirmative duties, the Court found a sys-
tematic practice of disappearances in Honduras. There was "public
and notorious knowledge.., that the kidnappings were carried out by
military personnel or the police, or persons acting under their orders
.... "159 The Court then shaped an important set of evidentiary infer-
ences. Evidence linking the disappearance of a particular individual to
official practice is always difficult if not impossible to obtain when the
facts remain in control of the defending government. Giving weight to
the investigation made by the Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission and evidence it presented in bringing the case, the Court
shifted to the government in control the burden of refuting the allega-
tions, thereby solving that problem along the lines of the Corfu Chan-
155. An excellent example might be the complicity of the former East German government
through its secret police with the terrorist known as "Carlos" implicating a number of private
actions. Recent security files made available to the free press have revealed that East German
agents monitored and tapped into every stage of the planning for the West Berlin discotheque
bombing in 1986 by terrorists and knew about the explosives and weapons smuggled to carry it
out. When Erich Honecker and other East German authorities were informed, they told the
agents to do nothing about it. Having intercepted messages from the Libyan Embassy in East
Berlin implicating Qaddafi, the United States bombed Tripoli and Benghazi ten days later. The
caption on the news report reads "Loose Cannons, Loose Reins." Whitney, East's Archives Re-
veal Ties to Terrorists, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1990, § 1, at 6. col. 1.
156. See id.; Lillich & Paxman, supra note 150.
157. See T. MERON, supra note 89, at 159-60 (disagreeing with the distinction drawn be-
tween aliens and nationals under customary international law in the Restatement (Third)).
158. Id. at 162-71.
159. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 91, 141
(ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
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nel Case.160 Recall that the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
refused to create a similar rebuttable presumption or evidentiary infer-
ence in the wrongful expulsion cases without explicit evidence pro-
duced by the claimant linking the revolutionary government to the
expulsion. The Inter-American Court faced this problem, squarely
combining well-established attribution principles of customary inter-
national law and sensible evidentiary practices.
If all governments, however, were to have affirmative duties to all
persons within their jurisdiction, then the central power of a legitimate
government to control private vigilante groups and death squads must
be strengthened, especially if any question of complicity of the secret
police might be involved, a curious dilemma for all modern liberal
democracies.16' Governments benefitting most from this trend are be-
nevolent autocracies and noblesse oblige polyarchies. 162
C. The Sabra and Shatila Massacre
Control over occupied territories also brings affirmative duties to
protect civilian populations, the failure of which is attributable to the
State. Following the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and
Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut by Phalangist militiamen during
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli Government estab-
lished a domestic Commission of Inquiry to determine responsibility
for the massacre and to make recommendations. 163 The Commission
placed "direct" responsibility upon the Phalangist forces who perpe-
trated the atrocities, and "indirect" responsibility on Israel. 164 Israeli
commanders gave no direct orders but knew of their Phalangist ally's
deep hatred of the Palestinians in the wake of atrocities against Chris-
tians. The Phalangists longed to avenge the murder of their admired
160. Id. at 61-62.
161. As Patricia Derian, said to Congress:
Whether these disappearances are the result of authorized actions, unauthorized excesses by
law enforcement and security agencies, paramilitary or private groups, governments are re-
sponsible for bringing them under control, even in times of emergency. There is no justifica-
tion under domestic or international law to such violations. Governments cannot pretend
not to know.
Human Rights and the Phenomenon of Disappearances: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1979)
(statement of Hon. Patricia M. Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs).
162. See supra notes 125 and 127 and accompanying text.
163. See Cassese, Genocide and the International Community. The Case of Sabra and Shatila,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 97-106 (E. Lutz, H. Hannum & K. Burke eds. 1989).
164. THE BEIRUT MASSACRE: THE COMPLETE KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT 55-56, 63
(1983) [hereinafter KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT].
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leader Bashir and the killing of several dozen Phalangists two days
before the force entered the camp.
"Indirect" responsibility followed from the decision to allow
Phalangists to enter the refugee camps, according to the Commission,
"without consideration of the danger - which the makers and execu-
tors of the decision were obligated to foresee as probable - that the
Phalangists would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabit-
ants of the camps, and without an examination of the means for
preventing this danger."' 65 The Report reasoned that the affirmative
duty to protect the civilian population devolved either from the duty
of an occupier of territory under rules of customary international law
or from "obligations applying to every civilized nation and the ethical
rules accepted by civilized peoples .. ".. ,,66 The Israeli public's stand
has always been that responsibility for such atrocities falls not only
upon those who actually riot or commit them, but also upon those
responsible for the safety and public order, "who could have prevented
the disturbances and did not fulfill their obligations in this respect."' 67
Israel's failure to anticipate the danger and to provide adequate con-
trol was an omission of State, "the basis for imputing indirect respon-
sibility to those persons who in our view did not fulfill the obligations
placed on them."' 68 The Commission then placed responsibility on
the various officials acting on behalf of Israel and made recommenda-
tions for sanctions.169
While the distinction between direct and indirect responsibility
might be used in a political or moral sense to distinguish shades of
culpability,1 70 it is quite clear even from the Israeli Commission that
such distinction confuses the attribution of omissions of State with the
wrongs perpetrated by the non-State actors, confirming the point lu-
cidly made by Ago in his concurrence in the Nicaragua Case. Con-
duct of the non-governmental Phalangists should not be indirectly
attributed to Israel unless it is that of a force controlled by Israel and
thus conduct indirectly that of Israel by transfer of State conduct.
Rather, the conduct of Israel should be attributed by reason of its own
omission, its particular failure of duty. Under contemporary attribu-
tion theory, such an omission of State is quite directly that of the State
and needs no mystical transformation. Given Israel's long-standing
165. Id. at 63.
166. Id. at 57.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 63.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 6 and 8 (shades of culpability in moral philosophy).
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legal and moral position on the failure of governments to protect Jew-
ish minorities in other countries, it could not duck its own failure of a
similar duty; but reflecting the modern trend to limit conduct attribu-
table to its narrowest link to action, the Israeli Commission used the
direct-indirect distinction as an effective lessening of the degree of re-
sponsibility. This political use in mitigation does not affect the legal
attribution of conduct from an omission of duty as such.
A similar imprecision in attribution analysis found its way into an
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal opinion that seemingly distin-
guished between the "direct" conduct of Iranian officials or agents and
that of the militants which later ought to have been imputed "indi-
rectly" to Iran by reasoning in the Hostages Case.171 But until the
militants were shown to have acted in fact for Iran, the conduct attrib-
uted to Iran in the Hostages Case was directly its own initial failure to
act to protect the Embassy and Embassy personnel and its subsequent
failure to intervene once the new government adopted the policies of
the militants as its own.' 72 There was nothing "indirect" about the
attribution of the inaction, even though the Court did not rest its deci-
sion solely on the failure of duty issue at the earliest point it might
have.
D. Failure to Control Parastatals
If a parastatalt 73 qualifies as an organ of State or acts de facto as an
agent under control of the State, attribution for any act or omission
follows traditional principles, but with stringent standards of proof of
control similar to those required for non-State actors such as the mili-
tants in the Hostages Case and for the Contras in the Nicaragua
Case. ' 74
1. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Cases
Two cases decided by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
demonstrate that evidence of tight government control over acts or
omissions of parastatals must be labelled wrongful before they can be
171. See Short v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 76, 83 (1987).
172. See Hostages Case, 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment on Merits of May 24).
173. These entities are
neither private legal persons nor simple organs of the state (according to the pertinent sys-
tem of internal law) but which are public in terms of their provenance and function. They
may be described as public corporations, 'parastatal entities,' or 'quasi-public' legal persons.
In appropriate conditions the state may become responsible for failure to control the acts
and policies of such legal persons ....
I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 162-63.
174. See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
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attributed to Iran. In each case, the Tribunal found insufficient evi-
dence to attribute acts of the parastatal to Iran even when the govern-
ment owned or controlled the entity. In one case, Iran took complete
control over two private shipping companies that later breached con-
tracts with the claimant. The Tribunal held that, in the absence of
evidence of "orders, directives, recommendations, or instructions" is-
sued by a government agency, the action could not be attributed to
Iran. t 75 In the other case, the Tribunal held that a State-owned bank
should be presumed to have acted in its commercial capacity when it
took control of and title to the claimant's building, in the absence of
evidence that it was acting as a State organ or with government com-
plicity in the transfer.176 These decisions make clear, as another deci-
sion stated explicitly,1 77 that attribution is a constituent element of the
claim requiring the claimant to sustain the burden of proof.
As Brownlie's strong criticism explains, any argument placing on
the claimant generally such "burden of proof (and, moreover, an ex-
acting standard of proof) in respect of the initial question of at-
tributability of the acts concerned" when the immediate actor was not
an official gives too much license to officials. 178 While the facts of each
case may require particular evidentiary presumptions and burdens,1 79
"no general presumption against attributability exits ... [for] such a
presumption would produce an odd result: the more bizarre and
bloodthirsty the behaviour of the state organs ... the easier it would
be for the respondent state to escape responsibility." 1 80
2. Martin v. South Africa
The case of Barry Martin dramatizes the use of strict attribution
standards to avoid State responsibility for official policy. The failure
of a State-owned South African hospital to give adequate medical
treatment to Martin, an injured African-American, presents a kind of
omission produced by the State's policy of apartheid carried out by
parastatal organizations. '8' Barry Martin is now a quadriplegic in the
care of the state of New York. As an African-American professional
175. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 149, 166 (1984).
176. International Technical Prod. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. C.T.R.
206, 238-39 (1985). This case draws upon the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as the test
for a presumption of non-attribution. See Harvard Draft, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
177. Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 92, 101 (1987)
("[A]ttributability of an act to the State is a constituent element of State responsibility.").
178. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 164-65.
179. Id., citing Youmans Claim (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 110 (1926).
180. Id.
181. Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1987).
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dancer, he was performing under contract in Sun City, South Africa in
the Transvaal township. 1 82 During that time and while a passenger in
an automobile of a White colleague, he was involved in an accident in
Transvaal. Both persons received injuries. A "White" ambulance
transported the White colleague to Paul Kruger Hospital, leaving
Martin at the scene of the accident. Later, a private automobile took
him to the same hospital. On arrival, he waited for a long time, re-
ceived no medical treatment, and eventually was transferred to the
"Black" section of the H.F. Verwoerd Hospital, sixty-five miles away
over rough roads. He waited there twenty-four hours before receiving
any medical treatment. Martin claims that he became a quadriplegic
during the wait and transfer from one hospital to the other and before
he received treatment.18 3 This injury, he claims, resulted from the fail-
ure of equal and proper care due to the South African government's
policy of apartheid.
Advised that action for compensation in South Africa would be
futile, Martin brought suit in the United States against South Africa,
the Transvaal Department of Hospital Services and the two hospitals.
The Federal Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the effects test
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").8 4
Should the U.S.. Department of State espouse an international
claim on his behalf against South Africa? 8 5 Should the United States
view the failure to provide adequate medical treatment as conduct at-
tributable to South Africa under its policy of apartheid? The custom-
ary international law of human rights most likely imposes a clear duty
not to discriminate in the treatment of aliens on account of race. 18 6
An official policy leading to a decision to refuse medical treatment or
discriminate in giving it on account of race in violation of this duty
182. Id.
183. Id. at 91-96.
184. Comment, Martin v. South Africa: Alienating Injured 'Americans, 15 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 153, 166-67 (1989). Martin brought suit in the Southern District of New York, but the
case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Martin failed to satisfy the direct effect re-
quirement of the FSIA and the defendants could, therefore, invoke sovereign immunity. Martin
appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit, attempting to show his injury had a direct effect in
the United States within the meaning of the FSIA. The Second Circuit affirmed the District
Court's dismissal. For a criticism of the opaque nature of sovereignty preventing adjudication of
universal human rights claims, see Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially. Jurisdictional
Discourse, the National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1302-05
(1990).
185. In a significant change in apartheid policy for medical treatment, South Africa recently
announced the opening of a desegregated public hospital for all races. Wren, South Africa to
Admit All Races As Patients in Its Public Hospitals, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1990, at AI, col. 3.
186. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 105, at 596-98.
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should reveal the clearest kind of conduct attributable to South Africa.
The failure of a parastatal following official State policy in disregard of
its international responsibility to an alien, however, would be easy to
characterize as non-attributable under the stringent burden of proof
developing in recent decisions for several reasons.
First, under the Iranian parastatal cases, were the United States to
present Martin's claim, it might have to prove attribution as an ele-
ment of the claim.'18 7 Since the hospitals in question probably were
not government organs at the time, the evidence might have to show
that some official of the government instructed the hospital to refuse
treatment. Second, even if a general instruction from the State policy
of official discrimination in hospital treatment were produced, would
that showing be sufficient to shift the burden to South Africa to show
that it did not apply or that the hospital's omission was independent of
State policy?
If a general presumption holds against attribution for an omission
by a parastatal under State policy of discrimination, the United States
would have a serious evidentiary problem. If, however, attribution of
an omission of State is not an element of the claim but may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence (as applied in the Corfu Channel Case
and the Honduran disappearances cases), then a policy of apartheid
applicable to State hospitals should be sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence of control to shift the burden to South Africa. No doubt the
causal linkage between the failure to accord equal medical treatment
and the resulting injury would be probed carefully, as well, under the
stricter standards for proving causation that Professor Caron has
examined. 188
The case demonstrates precisely that exacting standards easily
might lead to irresponsibility in situations where the State has exclu-
sive control. The burden of linking official policy of inaction or une-
qual treatment with non-State inaction in carrying out the State policy
becomes a near impossibility without more reasonable inferences. The
better view would be that the apartheid policy applied to hospitals is
so pervasive that the official failure of non-discriminatory medical
treatment to aliens in emergencies should be seen as directly attributa-
ble irrespective of whether the immediate actors were public or pri-
vate. The failure of policy itself is demonstrated by the fact that it
commands to provide treatment on the basis of race.
187. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
188. D. Caron, supra note 148.
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3. Loose Reins over State-Owned or Controlled Business
Enterprises
Attribution doctrine has used the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity in creating a separate sphere where conduct of State-owned
and even State-controlled enterprises does not become that of the
State.189 The test, as Sohn and Baxter stated it, is whether the enter-
prise is a separate legal entity under the law of the State and unable to
plead sovereign immunity in the courts of another State.' 90 The Inter-
national Law Commission would require the test of whether the enter-
prise exercised actual governmental functions.
Much of the underlying theory draws upon Dunn's realism in ar-
guing that the question of State responsibility for the protection of
nationals should rest solely upon whether the State, the enterprise or
the individual should bear the risk of potential harm resulting from
doing business in economic matters or of potential harm for personal
injuries.19' Dunn's theory proposes that, when settled expectations
are upset, the State should assume more of the risk. As Central Eu-
rope and the Third World face the reality of transforming non-market
and State-owned enterprises into those more compatible with private
or mixed markets, Dunn's analysis becomes far more relevant today
than it was in the 1920's and 1930's when he proposed it from the
realist tradition developing in the United States. 92 States have come
under pressure to maintain control by regulating commercial or other
activities that cause environmental or other harm across national
boundaries. 193 The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, for example,
allocates certain resources in all peoples as a whole and places a duty
on member States to control enterprises under their jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with a regime established under the treaty provisions.'
94
189. See J. Chalmers, State Responsibility for Acts of Parastatals Organized in Corporate
Form (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
Washington D.C., March 29, 1990). For criticism, see Christenson, supra note 3, at 332-33.
190. Harvard Draft, supra note 47, at 143, 155-56 (draft article 1 and commentary). See
supra note 5 for analogy to vicarious liability.
191. F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1932). But as Professor Nahmod asks in the context of risk analysis in-
volving constitutional tort in the United States, is an act or omission wrongful when it is
unconstitutional without regard to risk? Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Jus-
tice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997 (1990).
192. For the place of Dunn in modem theory, see Lillich, supra note 70, at 1-2, 31-32. For
the use of Dunn's theory in a utilitarian theory of attribution, see Christenson, supra note 3, at
335-36, 358 n.82.
193. See Lachs, The Challenge of the Environment, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 663 (1990);
Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1980).
194. Resources here refers to mineral resources on the "sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction," defined as the Area. United Nations Conven-
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Similar affirmative duties to control national enterprises are found for
the use of outer space, including commercial satellites, 195 pollution at
sea, 196  nuclear energy activities 197  and harm to the global
atmosphere. 98
The political pressure exerted by attributing omissions of State in
one sense tends to hold States increasingly accountable for failure to
control private and non-State activities. 199 The experience reviewed in
the present article, however, suggests a much more complex develop-
tion on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, at 2. See also id.
at 52 (article 136 (Common Heritage of Mankind), article 137 (Legal Status of Area and its
Resources)). Id. at 52. If the treaty enters force, regulation of deep-sea mining would be dele-
gated to the Seabed Authority. Resources from the deep seabed could only be mined in accord-
ance with the rules and procedures established by treaty provisions (e.g., section 3 (Development
of Resources of the Area)). Id. at 57-62. Under article 153 (System of Exploration and Exploita-
tion), only "state parties, or state enterprises or natural or judicial persons which possess the
nationality of state parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals when sponsored
by such states," will be given the rights in association with the Seabed Authority to conduct any
mining activities in the Area. Id. at 61-62 (article 153(2)(b)) (emphasis added). And article 139
(Responsibility to Ensure Compliance and Liability of Damage) States that damage caused by a
State party in carrying out its responsibilities "shall entail liability." Id. at 53 (article 139(2)).
The attribution of conduct for activities not those of the State would be for the State's failure to
control in the face of duty, an act of omission.
195. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Treaty on the Use of Outer Space]. Article 6 provides that the parties "shall bear
international responsibility for national activities in outer space .... whether such activities are
carried on by governmental-agencies or by non-governmental entities .... " Id. at 209. This
article explicitly requires "authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State
Party" when non-governmental entities undertake activities in outer space. Id. By General As-
sembly resolution adopted'Dec. 10, 1982, such responsibility is extended to "activities in the field
of international direct television broadcasting by satellite carried out ... under ... jurisdiction"
of a State. GA Res. 37/92 Annex, para. 8, 37 U.N. GADR Supp. (No. 51) at 98, U.N. Doc. A/
37/646 (1982).
196. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 25 (1970); Convention for the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 3,
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 262 (1972); Convention for the Prevention of Maritime Pollution from
Land-Based Sources, Feb. 21, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 352 (1974).
197. Miatello, International Responsibility for the Use of Nuclear Energy, in UNITED NA-
TIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 83, at 287. This study asserts that
the basis for attribution for operations of a private nuclear company would be 1974 Draft Arti-
cles, article 8, supra note 52, "[o]n account of the nature of the State's strict control over their
activities such companies would be considered to be persons acting on behalf of the State ......
Id. at 312. While this assertion of the basis for attribution might be shown as a matter of fact
under the exacting requirements demanding specific evidence of particular orders to a parastatal
(see supra notes 175, 189 and accompanying text), a much better theory of attribution would be
for failure of the State to maintain adequate supervision or control when under strict duty, in
other words an act of omission of State.
198. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, reprinted in
18 1.L.M. 1442 (1979); Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. Attribution theory builds
from the Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 1938 (1941). See Lachs,
supra note 193, at 665; Handl, supra note 193.
199. Christenson, supra note 3, at 335-41.
[Vol. 12:312
Acts of Omission
ment, including reluctance by States to attribute conduct to each other
when it results from inaction without the clearest affirmative primary
obligation shown to have been breached by the most stringent stan-
dards of proof. These trends modify the earlier appraisal, but confirm
the political and substantive underpinnings of attribution doctrine.
E. Intermediate Actors: Attribution for Failure to Control
The problem of attribution of acts of omission of semi-autonomous
political subdivisions or parastatals under State control (such as State-
owned ventures or joint public-private ventures) is becoming more im-
portant as the international community may have to address questions
such as Soviet responsibility for international wrongs in semi-in-
dependent nations such as the Baltic republics, United States' respon-
sibility for acts or omissions of Guam or Puerto Rico,2°° China's
responsibility for acts or omission of Macao or Taiwan, 20 1 the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization's responsibility for failure to prevent acts
of violence under its control, or Canada's responsibility for acts or
omissions in Quebec (anticipating a claim to looser association under
the Canadian Constitution after the failure of the Meech Lake ac-
cord).20 2 Moreover, in the movement from State-controlled enterprise
to market economies, attribution doctrine could easily become, as
Dunn tried to develop, a tool for allocation of responsibility for bear-
ing the risk of loss from international transactions and investments.
20 3
Shifting the responsibility away from governments to market mecha-
nisms provides an additional explanation of the movement away from
the protection function of governments, except when the government
clearly takes property or radically disrupts settled expectations.
2°4
The concept of "intermediate responsibility" would pierce through
the fictional personhood of a State and attribute both acts and omis-
sions to autonomous but politically connected subdivisions of a mod-
em State.205 Rather than holding the State accountable for failure to
control its political subdivisions and parastatals, this concept would
entail direct accountability under international law of intermediate
political and, perhaps, parastatal entities. The central State properly
200. See W. M. REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW
ROLES IN ASSOCIATION (1975).
201. J. HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOM-
MODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 150 (1990).
202. McConnell, The Meech Lake Accord: Laws or Flaws?, 52 SASK. L. REV. 115 (1988);
Baines, An Alternative Vision of the Meech Lake Accord, 13 QUEEN'S L.J., Winter 1988, at 1.
203. See F. DUNN, supra note 191, at 133-36.
204. Id. at 133-43.
205. Christenson, supra note 3, at 333-35.
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should be held responsible as well; but for its failure of supervision or
control on behalf of the community of States rather than for the direct
acts or omissions of the political subdivision or parastatal.20 6 Maybe it
is time to consider such an idea more broadly, as a middle ground
between the control expected but not practically realizable in the cen-
tral State and the totally private or non-governmental sphere. Con-
temporary international law of State responsibility does not recognize
this possibility yet, on the theory that the States system leaves to sov-
ereign States the internal maintenance of legal liability for public or
private acts and prevents the international legal order from interven-
ing in the internal allocation of power of the States themselves. 20 7
As shown in this study, however, the technical doctrine of attribu-
tion does reflect interposition from the international community. The
fiction of the sovereign State with complete internal control has also
succumbed to erosion of sovereignty in human rights and international
crimes cases, and de facto in the flow of money, people and ideas, but
not yet in the basic allocation of power and responsibility among polit-
ical subdivisions. The policy effect of the doctrine of attribution is to
assure national uniformity in keeping international obligations, but it
reinforces a fiction of complete control by the national authority when
it may have very loose reins, not necessarily by policy choice but from
ineffective control.
State responsibility through attribution theory should be revised in
light of the radical changes within many subpolitical entities which, in
the last decade, have claimed recognition from the international com-
munity. There has been a resurgence of rights being asserted by mi-
nority groups who have experienced a resistance by States to recognize
meaningful pluralism or self-determination. In many States, a new
political decentralization increases tensions between minorities and the
majority, and the minimum international standards of human rights
might be extended directly to sub-political organizations under some
looser national supervisory control. International law can help to rec-
206. The analogy to the Treaty on the Use Outer Space is a good illustration, for the treaty
uses the term "supervision" to describe the duty of the State over non-governmental outer space
activities. See, Treaty on the Use of Outer Space, supra note 195, at 209 (article 6).
207. The International Law Commission's draft articles 14 and 15 on State responsibility are
applicable not only to insurrectional movements but also to national liberation movements. In
its commentary to both articles the Commission affirmed this position and only saw the con-
tinuity between the liberation movement and the State (or government) created by these actions.
See 1975 Draft Articles, supra note 57, at 136-54.
This distinction has repercussions on the question of responsibility for acts committed by
organs of these movements especially with the introduction of the principle of the international
legality of national liberation movements. The objective of national liberation movements is to
carry out their struggle against non-democratic systems of domination and constraint which may
distinguish them from other internal conflicts. Atlam, supra note 148, at 35, 37-39.
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ognize these movements as legitimate by attributing to them the re-
sponsibility for inaction in the face of duty, without the fiction that the
central State must be responsible for the subdivision's own action or
inaction. Such supervisory responsibility would rest upon an attribu-
tion theory of failure to maintain adequate minimum control and
supervision.
In Canada, for example, the reassertion of quasi-independence of
French-speaking Quebec throughout the 1970s and 1980s in refusing
to approve the new Constitution is well known. In May of 1987, Que-
bec agreed to sign the 1982 Canadian Constitution under the terms of
the "Meech Lake Accord," which included amending the 1982 Con-
stitution, inter alia, to designate Quebec as a "distinct society. '20 The
agreement would have granted the legislature and government of the
French provinces power to preserve and promote its "distinct iden-
tity." With the failure of the ratification process by several provinces,
the question of Quebec's international status-possibly a loosely affili-
ated sovereign-suggests an intermediate status over which the central
government would not have complete control. Intermediate responsi-
bility through attributing to Quebec its own conduct that might not
meet minimum standards of international obligations would avoid the
fiction that the central government has political control over the appa-
ratus of international power and thereby assumes responsibility for
acts of the political subdivisions. Such realism would reduce the ten-
dency for a central government to deny responsibility in the face of
duty and would, under international law, place it squarely upon a
subordinate political group, clarifying the supervising authority's own
international obligations.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO"), another inter-
mediate non-State actor, has been recognized since its formation in
1964 as an international personality in the struggle of the Palestinian
people to return to their homelands. The PLO has been recognized by
the Arab League as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people; the United States has engaged the PLO in "substantive dia-
logue" off and on since 1987, essentially recognizing the PLO as being
in control of its eight constituent groups and expecting the PLO to
exercise control over these groups.209 Under intermediate responsibil-
ity, the failure of the PLO to control or punish illegal terrorist acts of
208. See also J. HANNUM, supra note 201, at 66; McConnell, supra note 202; and Baines,
supra note 202.
209. Friedman, Bush Calls Off US-P.LO. Talks, Citing Arab Raid, N.Y. Times, June 21,
1990, Al, col. 6; Atlam, supra note 148, at 45-46; W. MALLISON & S. MALLISON, THE PALES-
TINIAN PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 174-213 (1986).
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one of its constituent groups would be attributed to the PLO directly
without having to await its succession to the government of some
State.
VI. TRENDS: TIGHTER CRITERIA FOR ATTRIBUTING OMISSIONS
OF STATE
Close analysis of the decisional experience in light of the codifica-
tions confirms a trend of reluctance to attribute various omissions of
State absent strong treaty commitments otherwise. Special reluctance
applies to omissions involving protection of aliens. 210 The trends re-
flect an actual loosening of control over non-State or subordinate ac-
tors in some cases. A counter-trend toward attributing omissions is
noticeable when regional courts have jurisdiction and the tradition and
treaty obligations are strong and clear. While the trends may mean
that the traditional concept of the "nation-State" is in the process of
revision, it also may mean a more sophisticated consideration of iden-
tifying those with effective power to control decisions on behalf of the
State in relation to shared values and obligations. Four points summa-
rize and explain these substantive trends. A fifth point summarizes
the procedural aspects of the trends.
A. Attributing Omissions of State Depends upon Explicit
International Obligation to Act
National and international decision-makers alike resist finding an
affirmative duty on governments to act from customary international
law or treaty without the clearest normative expression of such duty.
While the World Court in the Hostages Case211 said that Iran may
have failed in its duty under international law initially to protect the
Embassy and diplomats from the militants, it rested its decision and
order only on the later specific approval by leaders of the successful
revolution.212 The stronger duty to protect arose after the militants'
acts were ratified. The liberal tradition insists on the widest presump-
tion that non-State actors are motivated solely by their own passion
and self-interest unless explicitly shown to have followed directions of
those in power.
210. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to extend the constitutional prohibition
against warrantless searches by U.S. enforcement officials to aliens abroad. United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990). U.S. law enforcement abroad, moreover, against
aliens has been extended consitutionally without regard to international law. See Lowenfeld,
U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 444 (1990).
211. Hostages Case, 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment on Merits of May 24).
212. Id. at 30.
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Similarly, in the wrongful expulsion cases of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, the decisions found no attributable omission of State
for Iran's failure of a duty to protect American citizens from being
driven from their homes and businesses and out of the country by pri-
vate Iranians. Only when the evidence showed explicit expulsion or-
ders from identifiable Revolutionary Guards was conduct
attributed. 213 Even the Israeli Commission of Inquiry on the responsi-
bility for the Beirut massacre reluctantly held Israel responsible only
"indirectly" for its failure to protect civilians in occupied territory.214
These decisions show reticence in attributing conduct for official fail-
ure of duty even in the clearest cases. On the other hand, where af-
firmative duty on States is found in treaties. applied by regional courts
such as the Court of Justice of the European Community, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, these courts are beginning to work out by generous construc-
tion a coherent doctrine for attibuting acts of omission in the face of
such duty to the States, even in relation to their own nationals, quite in
contrast with the direction taken by the U.S. Supreme Court.215
B. An Omission of State Must Be Willful and Linked to Injury
Even in the face of the clearest duty, any inaction attributable as
State conduct must be willful or "official" inaction. This requirement
imposes a subjective element for omissions. It distinguishes two types
of inaction. In the first type, the government deliberately fails to act.
In the second, the State simply does nothing for reasons of inertia or
impotence rather than malice. This trend moves away from the objec-
tive theory of State responsibility for omissions relied upon in the
Corfu Channel Case. The Honduran disappearances cases and the
wrongful expulsion cases, while major contributions to the attribution
of omissions of State, illustrate the difficulties of showing willful
neglect.
In the Honduran disappearance cases, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights relied upon the American Convention on Human
Rights for the clear affirmative duty to protect citizens from so-called
vigilante torture and death squads. 216 The circumstances and evi-
213. See supra note 131.
214. KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 164, at 63.
215. T. MERON, supra note 89, at 146, 161-71. See Strossen, supra note 121, at 846-49;
Forde, Non-Governmental Interferences With Human Rights, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 253, 271-78
(1985).
216. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 35, 69
(ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
Winter 199 11
Michigan Journal of International Law
dence created an inference of "official" omission in the face of Hondu-
ran government knowledge of disappearances for which it was
responsible by choice and complicity. 217 The European courts, too,
attribute conduct to States from failure of duty. 218
In other cases, however, the attribution of the omission of State is
scarcely a possible element of claim, as shown in the wrongful expul-
sion cases. Even if the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal had ac-
cepted that Iran had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect
Americans from the acts of angry private citizens, the American
claimants had to show a connection between inaction by the police
and the expulsion. 219 The most the American agent and claimants
could show was that there was a duty to provide reasonable protection
and a de facto situation at odds with this duty, and the Tribunal re-
fused to attribute the failure to control the private threats to Iran with-
out proof of direct link to the revolutionary government or a conscious
governmental decision not to protect.220 A paradox ensues. The trend
in attributing omissions of State proceeds from "objective responsibil-
ity," the organizing fiction of a State as a corporate legal person,
which measures conduct against obligation in the particular circum-
stances.221 Including in this trend the objective cause factor, the end
effect of decisions and practice is to require evidence that omissions of
particular officials are intentional and that either direct orders are
given to private actors or a clear linkage to omission is established. 222
The net result seems to be a constriction of State responsibility
through attribution decisions in customary international law. While
Brownlie surely is correct in rejecting any distinction between acts and
omissions of States on the basis of the principle of fault (as proposed
by Strupp and Guggenheim), the decisional trends outside the Euro-
pean courts have that precise effect. 223
217. Id. at 73. The court held that the failure of the Honduran court system to ensure that
the citizens would be protected was clearly proven from facts and inferences such as a domestic
court's refusal to grant a writ of habeas corpus to free one of those who "disappeared."
218. See supra note 215.
219. The same use of non-attribution was exhibited when German citizens, inflamed against
the Jews by the Nazi Party, forced many Jews to leave Germany while the police did nothing.
220. See Wrongful Expulsion cases, supra note 131.
221. While Brownlie does not agree with Lauterpacht's assessment of the Corfu Channel
Case as an affirmation of the principle of fault, he does view the Albanian omission as compatible
with objective duty and responsibility based upon knowledge of danger to shipping of giving
warning. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 42-43. Predicating this upon responsibility in the partic-
ular circumstances does not require a theoretical grounding, according to Brownlie, either objec-
tive or subjective. Id. at 40-42.
222. Ironically, introducing the natural law idea of intentional moral culpability originating
in Grotius has the effect of diminishing the ability to prove an omission of State.
223. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 42-43.
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In the Martin case, yet to reach the international level, the same
substantive issue arises. Martin would have to show that the failure of
the hospital to treat his injuries was "official" in the face of affirmative
duty, not simply negligent, and resulted in his injuries.224 Even with
apartheid as national policy, the link between that policy of discrimi-
nation and the case of injury as a result of inaction in following the
policy would be more difficult to show than if injury were presumed in
the circumstances from official failure of clear duty.
C. Direct and Indirect Attribution Should Not Be Confused
Even after attributing an act of omission to the State, a decision-
making body may sometimes try to distinguish between direct and in-
direct responsibility to mitigate the consequences. This false distinc-
tion creates needless confusion. 225  It was used nonetheless by the
Israeli Commission226 and in the Nicaragua Case227 to mitigate the
consequences of responsibility. Although Judge Ago concurred with
the World Court's decision in the Nicaragua Case, he criticized the
Court for its imprecise analysis. 228 He said that indirect responsibility
meant that a State that exerts control over the actions of another can
be held responsible for internationally wrongful acts committed by or
attributable to the second State.229 Judge Ago believes that indirect
responsibility is not the imputability to a State of unauthorized con-
duct of persons or groups that do not form part of the official appara-
tus of the State, what is often mistakenly referred to as vicarious
224. See Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1987).
225. It is difficult to perceive how any division of State acts into "direct" or "indirect" can
aid in determining whether an internationally unlawful act has been committed by a State. Attri-
bution for an omission can never be anything but direct in the sense that it can only arise after a
failure on the part of State organs to observe some international obligation incumbent on them.
A. FREEMAN, supra note 33, at 21-22.
226. See KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 164, at 50-63. The Kahan Commission
concluded that the "direct" responsibility for the perpetration of the acts of slaughter rested on
the Phalangist forces that actually perpetrated the massacre. The Commission also concluded
that those who made the decision to allow the Phalangist forces into the camps and implemented
this decision were "indirectly" responsible for what ultimately occurred, i.e., the Israelis were
indirectly responsible, even though they did not intend for the massacre to occur or anticipate the
danger. Id. at 55-56.
227. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on Merits of June 27). Judge Ago refers to
indirect responsibility as those situations in which one State that "exerts control over the actions
of another can be held responsible for an internationally wrongful act committed by and imputa-
ble to that second state." Id. at 189 (Ago, J., separate opinion).
228. Judge Ago cited the Hostages Case as the precedent to which the court should have
referred. In that case, the court ruled that the acts of the Iranian "militants" could not be
attributed properly to the Iranian Government because the "militants were not officially agents
of the state nor were they acting on its behalf." Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 190 (citing Hos-
tages Case).
229. Id. at 189 (Ago, J., separate opinion).
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responsibility. 230 Rather, indirect responsibility refers to a transfer of
responsibility from one State to another. 23'
D. Failure of Duty to Control Subordinate Political and Parastatal
Entities not Attributable without Actual Control
The element of actual control of a government over acts or omis-
sions of political subdivisions and subordinate groups or parastatal or-
gans is an increasingly relevant factor in attributing conduct to the
State. The trend recognizes looser political bonds of control (hence
stricter rules for attributing conduct from failure of control) between a
central government and political subdivisions or intermediate non-
State institutions in civil society. 232
The trend could accomodate Dunn's risk allocation theory, for-not
all harmful acts of organs and agents of the State would be attributable
to it. The test for allocating the responsibility under that theory would
be whether failure to control conduct threatens expectations for nor-
mal transactions. If it does, the risk, and hence the duty to control the
risk, is shifted from the individual to the State. 233 Stricter rules of
attribution simply confirm the liberal policy (whether conscious or
not) of looser controls over enterprise.
Control over non-State actors must be specific and directed before
their acts are attributed, under either the risk or objective theories,
even in the face of a duty to control, as the International Court of
Justice established in the Hostages Case and for the Contras in Nicara-
gua. The Martin case anticipates the trend of reluctance to attribute
conduct of service organizations to the State. A better basis for attri-
bution, however, is for a failure to exercise the supervisory controls
expected by the international community and reflected as
230. Oppenheim draws the distinction between original (authorized by government) and vi-
carious (unauthorized acts of agents or of private actors) responsibility from municipal law anal-
ogies, a source of great confusion, according to Brownlie. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 36. The
direct-indirect distinction generates similar confusion.
231. Hostages Case, 1980 I.C.J 3, 188-89 (Judgment on Merits of May 24) (Ago, J., separate
opinion).
232. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal thus refused to attribute to Iran actions of the
Iranian Ports and Shipping Organization in disrupting performance of a contract with an Ameri-
can company even though it was an official organ of Iran and its conduct harmed Sea-Land
Service. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 149 (1984). In
Sea-Land Service, the Tribunal decided that an "arrangement" between a U.S. shipping company
and the Iranian Ports and Shipping Organization (PSO) based on the "good faith of the parties,"
was not enforceable against the Iranian Government. Id. at 162-63. The Tribunal held that
disruptions in PSO's management and the subsequent confusion and inefficiency in the manage-
ment of the port facilities was not attributable to Iran as a whole because Sea-Land could not
prove that Iran acted intentionally to disrupt PSO and thus injure Sea-Land. Id. at 165-66.
233. See F. DUNN, supra note 191, at 133-43, 159-63.
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obligation.234
E. Process of Decision Affects Outcome
The context of the international decision process shapes the strin-
gency of the standards and burdens for attributing conduct to States
for their omissions and failures of control. This process serves impor-
tant substantive policies through evidentiary inferences and burdens of
proof in complex situations.
1. Presenting the Claim of Wrongful Omission
The most stringent practical burden for attributing wrongful con-
duct to a State for its inaction falls upon an injured, private alien such
as Barry Martin, who must show both a clear affirmative duty on
South Africa to prevent racial discrimination against aliens under cus-
tomary international law or treaty and in addition prove that the in-
jury was caused by willful failure of officials to act in the face of duty
(requiring exhaustion of local remedies with a denial of justice). Even
surviving exacting scrutiny by the Department of State or foreign of-
fice, such a claim meets resistence because it seeks to attribute conduct
from failure of action.
Private claimants before an international tribunal, when the claim-
ant's State espouses or presents the claim, bear similar burdens as
shown in the wrongful expulsion claims before the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. Evidentiary rebuttable presumptions from infer-
ences or equitable aids such as "constructive expulsion" encounter
similar resistance in these contexts. A tribunal requires the most di-
rect evidence and the clearest duty to be shown. These procedural
barriers further the emerging policy to reduce diplomatic protection
for aliens except in the most egregious cases and to focus upon the
collective pressure upon States to treat all persons within their juris-
diction according to minimum standards of human rights.
When a human rights commission or a collective judgment at the
political level investigates and brings the claim of systematic violation
of human rights, as the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
did against Honduras in the disappearances cases or the European
Commission and Courts have done, then the deference shown to the
investigation provides the basis for favorable inferences to be drawn
both from inaction in the face of international obligation and from
234. As in the duty to supervise non-governmental activities in the Treaty on the Use of
Outer Space. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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inaction in responding to inquiries for information. 235 Here, the pro-
cedural burdens of drawing inferences from affirmative international
duties and official inaction appear less stringent, especially with the
particularly competent judges situated in the regional human rights
courts.
When the State itself claims injury to its interests through official
inaction or through control of non-State conduct by another State, as
the United States did against Iran for failure to protect the Embassy
and hostages or as Nicaragua did against the United States for con-
duct of the Contras, then the clearest evidence linking the injury to the
failure of duty or control must be shown. The trend here moves away
from the favorable inference of fact drawn from Albania's control over
surveillance of the Corfu Channel that it knew of the mines and did
nothing to notify approaching ships. The fact that Iran and the
United States did not appear on the merits in the cases brought against
them before the International Court of Justice might have increased
the reluctance of the Court to draw inferences, create presumptions or
find evidence of affirmative international obligations. These respon-
dents removed themselves from the position of failure to respond for-
mally to inquiries of fact from which negative inferences could be
drawn. Honduras as a compulsory party before the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights found itself subject to inferences of fact drawn
from failure to explain or answer the Court's inquiries.
2. The Forum for Decision
The International Court of Justice requires the most exacting stan-
dards of responsibility and of proof of official inaction before attribut-
ing an omission to the State. A similar stringency is seen in the
decision of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. More flexible
standards and more creative decision-making come from the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in administering the clearer affirm-
ative obligations of the region, and similar observations hold for the
European courts. 236 Each of the regional human rights courts, how-
ever, takes a case only after investigation by its respective human
rights commission. This relationship provides much sounder basis for
inferences of evidence from failure to explain the results of a commis-
sion's findings. The Court of Justice of the European Community re-
lies upon facts and inference developed in national courts or
adminstrative organs.
235. T. MERON, supra note 89; Shelton, supra note 21; Strossen, supra note 121.
236. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at 151.
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When the decision forum leads to bilateral claim and response and
diplomatic settlement at the inter-governmental level, the traditional
reluctance of governments to hold each other responsible for failures
of duty, easily used as precedent for State practice against the claiming
government, leads to the most narrow claim for attributing such inac-
tion. When it is successful, the precise failure of duty might be left to
factual determination by an international arbitration or might be
mooted by the ex gratia device for settlement without conceding the
wrongfulness of the inaction, as in the Iranian airline incident 23 7 and
the Letelier assassination case. 238 When no question of control of the
event causing harm arises, as in the Canadian claim for damage caused
by the Soviet Cosmos 954 satellite, the conduct is attributable without
identifying the organ or official acting on behalf of the State. 23 9
3. Proposed Intermediate Process
The proposed process for intermediate responsibility would entail
presenting a claim for failure to control a non-State entity or failure of
duty by an intermediate political organization such as a parastatal en-
terprise or a quasi-sovereign state such as Quebec. Two conditions of
process would allow experience to develop. First, another State on
behalf of an injured national might present a claim directly to the in-
termediate organization or parastatal, with acquiescence or prodding
from the central government,24° directly reaching the question of offi-
cial inaction and placing the international community standards,
rather than the internal political standards artificially attributed to
sovereign States, in the position of maintaining accountability. Sec-
ond, an intermediate organization could be party to international adju-
dication with or without the tacit consent of the central government.
These procedures will be highly controversial, for they reduce the ex-
pectation by the international community that the sovereign State will
237. See Lowenfeld, supra note 210.
238. See settlement between Chile and the United States whereby Chile agreed to submit the
amount of compensation, but not liability, for the assassination to arbitration between the two
governments and to pay ex gratia (without admission of liability). Pear, Chile Agrees to Pay
Reparations to U.S. in Slaying of Envoy, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
239. See Canada: Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage Caused
by Soviet Cosmos 954, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 899, 902 (1979). The offer of ex gratia payment of
compensation by the United States for the shooting down of the civilian Iranian airliner accepted
attribution by virtue of control even though responsibility was not admitted.
240. In effect, that process occurred when Canada raised a claim against the United States in
1972 after the Liberian tanker World spilled 45,000 litres of crude oil while unloading at a refin-
ery in the state of Washington, thereby polluting the coast of British Columbia. Initially, the
Trail Smelter arbitration was invoked as the basis of responsibility, but later the claim was ad-
dressed to the ship owners who agreed to pay. See Feldman, Remarks, 68 PRoc. AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. 138, 141 (1974).
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maintain domestic political control so that its international obligations
will be safely kept. But in the imperceptible movement toward a more
cosmopolitan and global society, where the nation-State simply does
not have the realistic power to control all official failures within its
subordinate political entities, a process providing greater responsibility
to the rule of law in that evolving order would be most welcomed.
The forms already exist within confederations or functional communi-
ties such as the European Common Market, so the procedural device
would not be radical. Moreover, it would tend to place responsibility
for official inaction involving international obligations more directly
upon those accountable without straining the internal constitutional
order. Finally, the process would more closely link the most impor-
tant shared values of human dignity and human rights to those offi-
cials most directly responsible for maintaining them, but with
guidance from the larger society through the supervisory role of the
central State.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a theoretically totalitarian, absolute State, there would be total
control of all private conduct and both official action as well as official
inaction would be that of the State. Any attempt to carve out a sphere
of non-State or private action free from responsibility to other States
would be seen as nothing more than the ducking of responsibility of
maintaining that absolute control over the minutest detail of organized
human activity. If a citizen murdered a foreign migrant worker, or if a
mob lynched a foreigner, the State, because it could have prevented
the killings but chose not to, would have acted. The conduct would
not be the actual physical act, but rather the failure to exercise its
control to prevent the killings when it could and ought to have done
so. Any failure to control would be by definition an act of State. To
the external international community, it might even reject the volunta-
riness of objective obligation and assert a type of Hegelian super will,
under which it is not accountable to anything else because its organic
relationships are interpersonal and total universally. In effect, the
State would become a universal municipal law.
Such a State acts to allow internal recourse but not to be responsi-
ble to other States for the failure to control its public or non-State
elites or to prevent non-State or mob violence. The inaction or failure
to protect becomes in itself an instrument of control of the State
through its universal presence, hiding control under traditional non-
State action and double-think to deny responsibility for remaining su-
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pine, while so-called non-State actors could brutalize human beings
under the averted glance of officials.
By contrast, in a theoretically democratic liberal State, wide
spheres of private conduct would be free from State control. Ironi-
cally, though, the non-action by the State in the face of duty under
international law to act to protect human rights or fundamental free-
doms, including economic and social freedoms, of the person or family
from private abuse might lead to greater anarchy and political chaos, a
fear long associated with democracy. The tradition of civil society
with intermediate institutions that are neither market nor State offers a
form of pluralism to rethink the international legal order's attention to
attribution theory.24' Allocating supervisory responsibility and con-
trol to conduct of modern States in relation to non-State actors in an
exclusive system of territorial States will revise attribution theory to
reflect the new realities of power.242
In a democratic, pluralistic society, free elections minimize the dis-
parity between official power and de facto power or failure to control
when under an affirmative international obligation. An omission of
State is less likely to lead to abuse. Elected representatives in govern-
ment, however, do answer to powerful factions, and some representa-
tives might prefer not to act to control these powerful non-State
factions (for example, affirmative obligations under treaty to establish
effective controls over enterprises whose cumulative activities lead to
massive pollution of the environment or over-recovery of resources
from deep seabed mining) in order to stay in power. Ultimately, there-
fore, attribution theory will lead us to face a conflict between omis-
sions of State responding to democratic national polities and
affirmative obligations required for international cooperation.
When the international community tolerates failure to control,
thereby privileging actual power, a kind of anarchy of confrontation
mirrors an ideal not uncomfortable to the radical contractarians. 24 3
The requirement of showing the clearest affirmative duty and an offi-
cial decision of forebearance in the face of such duty, when the State
could reasonably act, increases the possible use of non-governmental
power by those in fact in control. If the instruments of State power
are controlled by factions or concealed elites, or if the de facto control-
241. See H. LASKI, supra note 5, at 273-74.
242. The Trail Smelter arbitral award, by party agreement, in fact did propose a supervisory
regime to ensure against continuing pollution from the smelting plant in Canada. The omission
of State in failing to have such a supervisory regime in the face of duty to control might be
viewed as attributable to the State, as opposed to the activities of the non-State enterprise. Lachs,
supra note 193.
243. Kropotkin, Zinn, Nozick, and Godwin.
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ling elites wish simply to cooperate with similar elites in other States
to immunize themselves from accountability, they. have every incen-
tive to hide under the old fiction that the State is a legally autonomous
sovereign person protected from responsibility for acts by non-State or
private parties.
Power hides, for the burden of showing that non-State actors exer-
cised governmental authority de facto is a difficult one. Moreover, any
affirmative duty of the State to control so-called non-government con-
duct in order to prevent an international wrong or achieve a positive
good now must survive (1) the very strictest scrutiny of the sources for
such duty, as in explicit provisions of a treaty or customary interna-
tional law, and (2) the now exacting burden of proof, aided considera-
bly by international legal processes, in establishing a linkage between
the harm and a conscious decision or policy not to act.
I have presented the substantive and procedural framework for at-
tributing government inaction or failure to control as conduct of the
State. The newest normative experiences reveal substantive policy un-
derpinnings that make this technical doctrine more interesting.
Trends developing within the framework of the comprehensive codifi-
cation of State responsibility by the International Law Commission
reinterpret the customary international law of State responsibility. In
these trends are tendencies not yet reconciled toward collective re-
sponsibility and control by the State for internal events and toward a
lessening of the claims of powerful States to protect their nationals
abroad or to control their subordinate non-State organizations (either
internally or abroad) in relation to international obligation.
One solution to the either/or quality of the false choice between
the two spheres of public and private responsibility would be to create
another, intermediate sphere of responsibility to accompany the
growth of autonomy in political subdivisions or parastatals and the
emergence of pluralistic intermediate institutions in civil society under
less control by central State elites, but still under supervision. Attribu-
tion of an act of omission of the central State will increasingly be for
failure of supervision when under international duty. Attribution of
an omission to an intermediate institution directly under international
law will then become a prudent artifact for recognizing this third
sphere, but the argument still begs the question whether the States
system would tolerate it.
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